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ABSTRACT
The dependence of large metropolitan areas on public mass transit service
for the daily commute and for mobility in general is such that a disruption
of transit service can create severe congestion and adversely affect
business activity in the urban area. This thesis explores how local
government agencies can act in advance of urban transit service stoppages
to prepare transportation contingency plans and then implement the required
response strategies when a stoppage actually occurs.
Some theoretical issues relevant to organizational decision-making and
planning in crisis situations are considered first, as past research on
contingency planning for natural disasters is reviewed. The more practical
aspects of contingency planning in the context of urban transit are
identified from case studies of recent experiences with transit stoppages
in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. These theoretical and practical
considerations are then combined to create a generalized framework for
urban transportation disruption contingency planning.
The findings of this research suggest that the existence of a contingency
plan developed in anticipation of a service disruption can indeed enable
government agencies, with the cooperation of private sector interests,
to implement a coordinated and effective response. The three cases examined
highlight the fact that the process of contingency planning is just as
important to the success of the response effort as the plan that is
ultimately developed and implemented. In addition, political considerations
related both to the actual disruption and to the government response effort
are likely to influence many aspects of the contingency planning process.
The net result is that the most effective response efforts to transit
service stoppages are those based on a crisis management structure developed
well in advance of the stoppage, or over the course of previous stoppages.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Michael D. Meyer
Title: Associate Professor of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW
1. Interruptions to Urban Mass Transit Services
The daily patterns of urban travel are shaped by millions of
individual decisions as to the need for, timing of, and mode used for
intra-urban trips, and by less frequent individual and public policy
decisions concerning the spatial location of residential, commercial,
and institutional activities. Given these decisions and the resultant
travel patterns, the urban system, under routine conditions, tends
toward some form of equilibrium between travel demand and supply in
terms of the timing, routing, and mode of urban travel.
Although the travel routines in most urban areas reflect an
overwhelming preference for, and dominance of, the private automobile
for intra-urban trips, the largest metropolitan areas have special
characteristics that make them highly dependent on mass transit to
accommodate the demand for urban travel, particularly for trips to and
from congested Central Business District (CBD) areas. High population
densities and low car ownership levels, when combined with intense
temporal and directional peaking of travel demand, enable modal splits
in the more congested corridors of older U.S. cities to reach 70 percent
in favor of public transit.
The suspension of mass transit services, for whatever reason,
can therefore be a tremendous shock to an urban area's transportation
system, particularly for those metropolitan areas in which transit ac-
counts for a significant percentage of urban trips. Individual travel
patterns can be adversely affected, as a major mode of urban travel is
suddenly no longer an option. A substantial proportion of the urban
population can thus be forced to adapt by selecting another mode,
possibly adjusting trip timing, or foregoing trips entirely. This need
for a sudden shift in travel behavior is aggravated by the fact that
transit services can be shut down literally overnight, allowing very
little time for the public to adapt.
In the past, the shutdown of an urban area's mass transporta-
tion service has been associated primarily with management-labor
disputes over union contract settlements. Transit employee strikes have
interrupted transit operations in recent years in New York (1980),
Philadelphia (1981), Toronto (1979), and Montreal (1980 and 1982) for
periods of more than a week in each case, and commuters in numerous
other North American cities have had to cope with similar service
disruptions.
More recently, a trend toward fiscal austerity in government,
combined with a "growing perception that the fiscal appetite of public
transit is voracious and extremely difficult for elected officials to
control",[l] has made the possibility of a suspension of transit service
due to inadequate operating subsidies very real in many cities. In
fact, this possibility has already become a reality in Boston, Chicago,
and Birmingham, Alabama, where public transit operations were shut down
for varying periods while politicians at different levels of government
debated the funding arrangements necessary for continued transit
service.
With the U.S. government planning to phase out federal
operating subsidies to mass transit systems by 1985, effectively re-
ducing the "revenues" of large transit agencies by almost 15 percent, an
increasing number of cities will be facing the potential of a shutdown
of transit service because of financial predicaments. The likelihood of
transit service interruptions is further increased by the fact that, as
transit managers attempt to reduce costs in the face of public subsidy
constraints, the potential for serious disputes with labor unions over
wages and benefits will also increase.
Whether caused by a labor dispute or a financial/political
crisis, a transit service interruption that forces a substantial propor-
tion of a metropolitan area's population to suddenly alter its travel
behavior carries with it the possibility of severe congestion and
chaotic travel conditions. In situations where public authorities make
little or no effort to prepare in advance for such a disruption, the
travelling public, it could be argued, will still be able to adapt to
the characteristics of the disrupted urban transportation system and a
new urban travel equilibrium will in time be reached. The temporal and
directional intensity of travel within large metropolitan areas, how-
ever, is such that, without some form of response from public
authorities, congestion in core areas can become unmanageable to the
point of endangering public safety and adversely affecting the economic
health of core area businesses.
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Prior to a number of past transit system shutdowns, public
authorities did undertake some form of advance planning for the travel
impacts of the disruptions. The planned actions, whether based on
informal agreements to act in the event of a service disruption or on a
detailed and structured response framework, were the products of a
contingency planning effort. A contingency plan, in whatever form it
takes, at the very least outlines the response actions to be implemented
in the event of a shutdown and identifies the actors responsible for
their implementation. The contingency planning process itself can also
have a role in determining the success of a response effort, as the
intra- and inter-agency relationships developed in the process can
enhance the likelihood of mounting an effective government response.
2. Purpose of This Research
By comparing several recent contingency planning efforts for
metropolitan mass transit service interruptions and relating actual
experiences to the more theoretical concepts of emergency planning,
organizational behavior, and policy-making and implementation, this
thesis develops a framework for planning for transit service stoppages
that is both theoretically sound from a planning perspective, and
practical given the many constraints of the urban decision-making arena.
The results of past research on emergency planning and organizational
response to unexpected events such as natural disasters are used to
develop several theoretical propositions concerning the need for *and
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usefulness of contingency planning for urban transit service disrup-
tions.
Three recent transit service interruptions and the government
efforts to cope with a lack of mass transit are then explored in the
context of these propositions. The actual contingency planning efforts
are examined in terms of the process of response planning, the measures
contained in the plans, implementation of the measures during the dis-
ruptions, and the post-disruption impacts of each contingency planning
process. In addition, the highly politicized nature of most transit
system shutdowns, and the influence of a volatile political environment
on all aspects of contingency plan preparation and implementation, are
discussed in detail.
The relative levels of success achieved by the contingency
planning approaches used in the case studies, together with the theore-
tical concepts relative to response planning, provide a basis for the
development of an urban transit service stoppage contingency planning
framework. Questions of how specific situations and environments can
constrain the universal applicability of such a framework are addressed,
and the problems that seem to be inherent in the planning environment
before, during, and after a disruption are discussed. The contingency
planning framework focuses on the aspects of response preparation that
can be improved through additional effort on the part of the public
authorities responding to a transit service disruption.
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The development of a more consistent approach for responding
to mass transit service disruptions is timely for several reasons. A
very basic reason is that, although emergency planning and disaster
response issues have been examined in the past, almost no attention has
been given to the concept of contingency planning for disruptions to
urban transportation systems. This lack of past research is reflected
in the past inconsistency in contingency planning for transit disrup-
tions among different metropolitan areas. A more practical reason for
the development of such a framework involves the magnitude of the impact
of transit service interruptions on large metropolitan areas. As
mentioned, the suspension of transit service can adversely affect not
only those directly dependent on transit for mobility, but car drivers,
employers, and retailers as well. Finally, the future of urban transit
funding, particularly in the United States, is such that there is a
significant probability of future transit system stoppages in major
metropolitan areas.
This examination of contingency planning progresses from a
general, conceptual discussion of the merits of contingency planning to
a more practical assessment of actual response planning efforts, and
ultimately, to the development of a response planning framework. The
remainder of this chapter focuses on conceptual aspects, as relevant
past research is reviewed and several propositions about contingency
planning in the urban transit context are made. Chapter Two outlines
the case study methodology used in this research, and its shortcomings.
As well, a brief summary of each of the three case studies examined is
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presented.
The remainder of this thesis deals with contingency planning
issues in the order that they would be encountered in any agency's at-
tempt to lead a response effort. Chapter Three examines the pre-
disruption preparatory phase as a process of contingency planning,
focussing particularly on issues of organizational behavior and inter-
agency coordination and cooperation. The contingency plan itself is
dealt with in Chapter Four. The overall goals of a response plan are
discussed, and the general characteristics of an effective plan are
identified. In addition, specific measures for dealing with transit
service disruptions are reviewed, and past experiences with these
measures are evaluated. Chapter Five deals with the post-disruption
impacts of a contingency planning effort. The influence of a comprehen-
sive planning effort on inter-agency relationships, permanent transpor-
tation programs and projects, and potential future transportation
disruptions is discussed.
Chapter Six ties many of the issues together by presenting a
discussion on how political realities surrounding a potential disruption
can limit any attempt at comprehensive contingency planning. The
discussion is in part somewhat of a caveat to those hoping to undertake
a comprehensive response planning effort based on the propositions of
the three preceding chapters. A review of the politics surrounding the
case study disruptions highlights the possible impediments to effective
contingency planning.
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Finally, the concluding chapter outlines a conceptual frame-
work for contingency planning for urban transit disruptions. Both the
characteristics of an effective response effort identified from the case
studies and the possible constraints to response planning are integrated
into the framework.
3. Past Research Relevant to Contingency Planning
Past research on the process of contingency planning, parti-
cularly in the context of urban transportation system disruptions, has
been limited. Studies of transportation energy contingency planning
efforts are among the most recent, many of which have been completed
since the last experience of metropolitan areas with severe gasoline
shortfalls in 1979.[2,3] These assessments of metropolitan-wide energy
contingency plans have found that, in general, there is little consis-
tency among contingency planning efforts at the metropolitan level, in
spite of federal government initiatives and encouragement.[4] The mul-
titude of agencies and interests involved in transportation at the
metropolitan level, combined with a reluctance on the part of many
actors to commit resources to a plan which deals with a very uncertain
series of events, have impeded the development of comprehensive energy
contingency plans in most metropolitan areas.
The most complete energy shortfall contingency plans at the
metropolitan level have been developed by, and deal with the operations
of, metropolitan transit agencies. The research efforts mentioned above
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found that, not surprisingly, many transit agencies have been able to
formulate effective energy contingency plans on their own. In most
cases, the measures contained in these plans involve only the operations
of the transit agency, meaning a minimal amount of input and cooperation
from outside interests would be required for effective implementation of
the contingency measures during an energy shortfall.
Although several basic characteristics of metropolitan energy
contingency planning (e.g. the need for inter-agency coordination) are
shared by the process of contingency planning for urban transit service
disruptions, there are major, obvious differences. When transit service
is interrupted, an urban travel mode is suddenly and totally removed
from the choice of modes available for intra-city trips. The transpor-
tation expertise of perhaps the most experienced transportation
operating agency in the metropolitan area is lost at the same time as
the responses required by the disruption necessitate effective coordina-
tion of diverse agencies with different jurisdictions. Furthermore,
because a transit service disruption results from a locally-based
dispute of some sort (as opposed to a nation-wide gasoline shortage),
the potential for serious politically-induced conflicts among the
interests involved is far greater.
Issues of inter-organizational conflict, decision-making, and
response implementation in a disrupted planning environment have been
examined in the past primarily with respect to natural disasters and the
resultant community or government response. Most closely related to
urban transportation contingency planning are studies of organizational
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behavior in disaster situations and of the emergency planning process in
general.
One of the first studies of the characteristics of organiza-
tional response to a disaster was an examination by Roscow of government
response in two communities to tornado destruction.[5] He found that,
during the crisis period, conflicts over the assignment of responsibili-
ties, over priorities for action, and over the meaning of statements
made by public officials tended to develop among responding organiza-
tions. Similar research by Form and Nosow[6] and by Barton[7] estab-
lished the basis for much of the more recent research of intra- and
inter-organizational behavior both during and after natural disasters.
Recent studies have focussed more on the organizations
directly responsible for responding to a disaster, such as police and
civil defense agencies. Among the issues addressed have been the nature
of organizational communications during crises,[8] the functioning of
established organizations under crisis conditions, [9] and organizational
innovation both during[10] and after crises.[ll]
The findings of these research efforts are relevant to an
examination of contingency planning for urban transit service disrup-
tions in several respects. First, a focus on intra-organizational
variables such as "mandate in crisis situations" and "capacity to
respond" is important, given that public agencies will be primarily
responsible for dealing with a transit service disruption. A transpor-
tation system disruption that requires immediate action, if it has any
element of surprise associated with it, will likely create increased
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workloads and unexpected stress for the organizations and their members.
The net result is that, within policy-making and implementing agencies,
disruptions to the normal routine tend to inhibit rather than facilitate
the decision-making performance of policy-makers.[12]
Secondly, the need for coordinated action among diverse
agencies and the relationship between organizational actions and politi-
cal authority in the urban area also become important variables in
investigating contingency planning efforts and responses to disruptions.
As was the case with organizational functioning in crisis situations,
inter-organizational relationships can also be adversely affected by
crisis-related stress at a time when increased policy coordination and
cooperation is most desirable.[13]
The approach most often used in the past for facilitating
inter-agency coordination in situations where no advance preparation for
a disruption had been made involved the formation of an ad-hoc committee
responsible for crisis response coordination. The problem with such an
approach, however, is that ad-hoc committees are less effective in
crisis-oriented policy making than more established groups. Ad-hoc
committees have proven to be inferior in their decision quality,
resource utilization, and creativity in formulating responses to crisis
situations.114,15,16] The concept of contingency planning is in part a
response to the intra- and inter-organizational problems related to the
use of ad-hoc committees and reliance on spontaneous, crisis-oriented
decision-making,
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The second research area of relevance to urban transportation
contingency planning, one which also involves several aspects of the
organizational issues mentioned above, relates to the importance of
emergency planning as a process. The process of planning for unexpected
disasters or crises has only recently received attention in the planning
literature. Of the most recent research efforts, three provide much of
what is known about disaster planning. Perry, who examined incentives
for ensuring compliance with evacuation orders, argued that behavioral
research could be an integral component of disaster plans.[17] The
emergency planning process proposed by Perry assumes that pre-disaster
planning can in fact produce positive effects during a disaster res-
ponse.
Wenger et al. examined 71 disaster plans and found that
emergency planning efforts seemed to be pre-occupied with the production
of a plan, and that little attention was given to implementation
processes.[18] Finally, a study of the community response to the
eruption of Mount St. Helen's in May 1980 focussed on the link between
response planning and the actual response of 26 communities.[19] An
important conclusion of this study was that, while the planning process
was judged by local officials to have been worthwhile, the actual
response measures proposed in the regional disaster plan generally went
unused. Community officials instead relied on numerous informal and
ad-hoc measures to organize a disaster response.
Past research of emergency response planning and of actual
responses to disasters has served two major purposes, both of which are
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especially relevant to contingency planning for disruptions to urban
transit services. First, the results of these studies have generally
supported the notion that, prior to the actual occurrence of a disrup-
tion, contingency planning efforts can help to "facilitate recognition
of emergency demands and to make more effective the community
response".[20]
Secondly, and perhaps of greater importance to the topic of
this thesis, the studies outlined above have identified several aspects
of contingency planning that are crucial to an effective disaster
response. Through an examination of the shortcomings of numerous
government response efforts, past research efforts have found that an
effective contingency planning efforts should:
(1) clearly identify the priorities for a government-led response;
(2) provide for inter-organizational coordination of response activi-
ties;
(3) delineate specific tasks and responsibilities for the organizations
to be involved; and
(4) relate the likely behavior of groups and individuals in a disaster
situation to the types of measures included in the contingency
plan.
Although disruptions to urban transit services are different
from the natural disasters studied to date, many of the insights on
disaster planning gained from this past research can be related to urban
transportation contingency planning. Still, the differences between
natural disasters and urban transit system disruptions are substantial.
In the latter case, more advance warning of a potential disruption is
usually available, individuals can eventually adapt to the disruption
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without a great deal of government intervention, and the political
atmosphere surrounding the disruption and its cause is often far more
volatile than it is in the case of natural disasters. These significant
differences highlight the need for a closer examination of the charac-
teristics of an effective contingency planning process for urban transit
service disruptions.
4. Planning for Transit Stoppages: Some Propositions
As mentioned, past studies of emergency planning and disaster
response efforts have provided insight into organizational behavior
during emergencies, and have identified several characteristics of ef-
fective contingency planning in the context of natural disasters. The
results of these past efforts can be used as a basis for the development
of a contingency planning framework for urban transit system stoppages.
A contingency plan prepares a community for a disruption
before it occurs by detailing both the actions that could be taken and
the actors responsible for their implementation. In addition, the
actual process of contingency planning can have a great impact on the
effectiveness of a response effort and the ability of the system to cope
with the disruption. The relative success of a contingency planning
effort can be affected by both intra- and inter-organizational relation-
ships, by the nature of the actions included in the plan, and by the
manner in which the selected actions are formulated, implemented,
monitored, and perhaps maintained after the disruption.
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Based on the findings of past research and concepts of
organizational and inter-organizational theory, several important
aspects of the urban transportation contingency planning process are
highlighted below, and a number of propositions concerning the contin-
gency planning process are made. These propositions will be subjected
to analysis, given the outcomes of contingency planning efforts in three
recent cases, and will form the basis of a general contingency planning
framework applicable to situations involving urban mass transit service
interruptions.
(i) Crises and Organizational Decision-Making
One fundamental reason for planning a response to a disrup-
tion before it occurs involves the decision- and policy-making functions
of those agencies and organizations that will have to take some sort of
action in the event of a disruption. During an interruption to urban
transit service, each organization affected by the shutdown faces new
demands, and policy makers are confronted with a situation requiring im-
mediate action. Such a demand for action, if coupled with an element of
surprise, puts pressures on both the agencies and individuals reacting
to the disruption. As mentioned above, decision-making within
organizations can be adversely affected by the onset of an unexpected
change to routine.
The existence of a contingency plan in such a situation can
help reduce the element of surprise associated with a disruption, the
workload associated with formulation of response measures, and the over-
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all level of confusion over the role in the response effort of an
involved organization. The presence of a planned response should faci-
litate the implementation of response measures selected by an organiza-
tion by specifying in advance the strategy it will follow in the event
of a transit system shutdown, and consequently minimize the number of
policy decisions to be made under crisis-like conditions.
(ii) Inter-Agency Coordination of Response Activities ~
While a contingency plan can be helpful to the individual
responding agency, the fact that a transit system shutdown affects the
activities of many organizations within a metropolitan area necessitates
responses from numerous, and diverse, interests. In an environment
where the responses of a great number of actors or groups are inter-
related, the efforts made to improve cooperation and coordination among
agencies during the planning process can make or break a contingency
plan.
As was the case with organizational functioning in crisis
situations, inter-organizational relationships can also be adversely
influenced by disruption-related stress at a time when increased co-
operation is essential for an effective, coordinated response effort.
Where no advance preparations for facilitating inter-agency coordination
have been made, the typical response at the onset of a disruption, as
mentioned, is the formation of an ad-hoc committee responsible for
response coordination. A structured contingency planning process, on
the other hand, can both provide a forum for the coordination of
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proposed response actions among the agencies to be involved, and create
what is in essence a new decision-making unit which can operate during a
disruption as a coordinating body that is somewhat more established. If
the contingency plan is developed with future disruptions in mind as
well, the inter-organizational relationships and responsibilities may be
applied in future situations requiring inter-agency coordination.
(iii) Linking Response Planning to Implementation
The participation of the responding agencies in the contin-
gency planning process can enhance inter-agency relationships and improve
coordination of the response effort, but cooperation and coordination
alone cannot ensure that the response measures proposed in the planning
process will actually be implemented correctly. A major problem
encountered in contingency planning involves the willingness of all
organizations involved to both prepare for a disruption, and then res-
pond with the planned actions once it does occur. In both the intra-
and inter-organizational contexts mentioned above, the decision units
responsible for plan preparation rarely have the capacity to implement
the measures directly. Thus, although "a contingency action may be
timely, well thought-out and ... the best to cope with a disruption, the
system may still end up in a disaster through faulty implementation
techniques".1211
Problems associated with the implementation of planned
measures by the agencies assigned the responsibility can be attributed
to a lack of motivation to carry out the actions on the part of the
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implementing units, poor communications between decision-makers and
implementors, inflexible operating routines, or simple misunderstanding
of the assigned responsibilities.[22] One approach to improving the
motivation of implementing units, and thereby increasing the likelihood
of successful implementation, is to involve at least one representative
of each in some aspect of the planning process. When a group prepares
for a disruption, each member participating is more likely to develop
a commitment to making the selected actions work.[23] An effective
contingency planning process would therefore involve as many of the
organizations to be responsible for plan implementation as is practical.
Such a comprehensive approach to contingency planning can promote ac-
ceptance of the proposed measures by the organizations responsible, and
increase the likelihood of successful implementation.
(iv) Format of the Contingency Plan
Along with considerations of inter-agency coordination and
implementation, the format of the contingency plan itself and the types
of measures it includes will also have an influence on the success of .a
response effort. A structured plan clearly defines the response actions
to be implemented, and explicitly identifies the agencies responsible
and the resources to be employed. On the other hand, a flexible format
permits responding agencies to monitor events associated with a disrup-
tion, and to react to any unanticipated problems which may arise.
The balance between structure and flexibility in a
contingency plan has been suggested by a number of researchers. For
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example, Ashley found that "a well-structured plan is a basis for effec-
tive crisis management, but a plan so structured that no allowance can
be made for surprise events is inflexible, and thus undesirable".[24]
He proposed that an "ideal" contingency plan should consist of small
pre-structured components forming a larger response/decision framework
to be used in an anticipated disruption. As the disruption evolves,
these components would be modified or updated to meet changing condi-
tions.
(v) Post-Disruption Impacts
While a contingency planning process is expected to have
effects on a system under disruption before and during the disruption,
it is possible that the existence and use of a contingency plan in a
disruption can have impacts on the transportation planning and implemen- -
tation environment after the disruption is over. Because a crisis not
only disrupts a system, but also acts as a "device of change", the
presence of a prepared response plan can in some situations affect the
state to which a disrupted system returns.{25]
At both the intra- and inter-organizational levels,
established operating routines are usually inadequate for coping with a
major disruption, meaning that adaptive changes are likely to be made
both in preparation for a disruption, and as the disruption develops.[26]
If the contingency planning process can help develop some inter-agency
rapport and establish an overriding concern for the functioning of the
urban transportation system as a whole, innovative transportation
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policies may be readily accepted by organizations in search of solutions
to transportation problems created by the disruption. Once implemented,
such innovative programs or projects, if successful during the disrup-
tion, have a better chance of being retained for permanent use.
The above characteristics of contingency planning in the
urban transit service disruption context can best be summarized in the
form of five propositions about the need for, and the usefulness of,
effective contingency planning for potential transit system shutdowns:
(1) Within each organization to be involved in the response effort, a
contingency plan can reduce the element of surprise, the need for
hastily formulated response measures, and the overall level of stress and
confusion associated with the disruption of any organization's normal
routine, thereby allowing more time to be spent during the disruption on
response implementation and monitoring.
(2) Among the different organizations to be involved in a response ef-
fort, a contingency planning process not only defines implementation
responsibilities, but creates what is in essence a "new" planning unit
that deals with the imminent disruption, and that can be re-constituted
in future situations where inter-agency planning and coordination is
desirable.
(3) Participation in the response planning process of representatives
of each agency to be involved in the response effort can help to promote
the acceptance and subsequent implementation of proposed measures by the
organization responsible.
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(4) There are characteristics of a contingency plan, apart from the
actual measures it contains, that enhance its effectiveness as a
government-initiated response to a transit service disruption. While
the plan needs enough structure to define the response measures, al-
locate responsibilities for their implementation, specify the resources
to be used, and outline the mechanisms for response coordination, it
should be flexible enough to permit adaptive changes to be made to the
planned measures as the disruption progresses.
(5) Because a disrupted system is likely to change during the course of
a real or threatened crisis, the contingency planning process can be
used to direct this change. The existence of a contingency plan can
serve to alter inter-agency relationships in the planning arena, or it
can allow the implementation of innovative transportation policies or
projects during the disruption that can be maintained permanently once
implemented.
The above propositions will be tested, based on actual
experiences with contingency, planning for urban transit service stop-
pages. Each proposition will be further discussed under the relevant
headings in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The next chapter first deals with the
study methodology used in this research, and summarizes the three case
studies of contingency planning which were selected.
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CHAPTER TWO
CASE STUDIES OF TRANSIT STOPPAGE RESPONSE EFFORTS
Experiences with disaster planning have provided the basis
for most of the past research on government-led response to crises or
disruptions. Recent experiences of major cities with transit system
shutdowns, and the efforts made by public authorities in planning for
these disruptions, provide a more relevant foundation for the develop-
ment of a generalized contingency planning framework for use in metro-
politan areas. The case studies examined in this research are
summarized in this chapter to provide both background information to,
and a general reference for, the discussion in the remainder of this
thesis. First, however, the case study methodology employed is out-
lined, and its shortcomings identified as a caveat for the development
of further conclusions and generalizations.
1. The Case Study Methodology
Two of the most important defining characteristics of transit
system shutdowns - their infrequency in any one metropolitan area, and
the overall uncertainty associated with their occurrence - are the two
factors that make a systematic analysis of planning for such stoppages
rather difficult. As well as presenting methodological problems, the
different contexts and environments in which different transit service
disruptions occur also mean that any generalizations must be made with
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caution.
In the selection of an appropriate research strategy, it was
this relationship of the characteristics of specific response planning
efforts to their particular contexts that, in essence, ruled out all but
the case study approach to analysis. The case study approach is an
attempt to examine a given phenomenon in its context, "especially when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident".[1]
The "data" to be included in each case study consist of those events
deemed to be important, or at least relevant to the analysis, by the
researcher himself.
The nature of the contingency planning process, or for that
matter any planning process, presents major problems for the researcher
hoping to develop case studies of contingency planning. At the outset,
it is difficult to define what is meant by a "successful" contingency
planning and response effort. Even if there exists some agreement among
those involved as to the basis of an "effective" planning and response
process, the ability of the researcher to obtain such information may be
constrained. Because the outcome of a planning effort depends on the
actions of numerous individuals, the researcher is limited to collecting
information from: (1) direct participation in the process itself;
(2) interviews with those involved in the planning process; and/or (3)
observation of the outputs of the process. The unexpectedness of
transit system shutdowns made direct participation difficult during this
research. Instead, personal interviews and examination of the planning
outputs and outcomes (i.e. the plans produced, the actions implemented,
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and their impact on travel patterns) form the basis of the data col-
lected.
The specific problems arising in the development of indivi-
dual case studies involve both the sources of information used and the
interpretation of the information gathered. The information collected,
whether from personal interviews or actual observation, is subject to
bias on the part of the researcher, and especially on the part of those
actually involved in the planning efforts. By using as many sources as
possible and compiling supplemental information to corroborate what
those involved say, the researcher can attempt to piece together what
tends to be a puzzling assortment of "facts". The point to be made is
that, in case studies based on qualitative information, the perspectives
of the researcher can play a role in influencing the analysis. The
individual case study can thus become a fairly subjective account of the
events of a particular situation.
Relating the major characteristics of two or more case studies
in such a situation presents additional problems. Cross-case analysis
is a methodology which carries with it no prescribed approach to
analysis, once again making the details of its application a fairly
subjective exercise. The researcher must face, and somehow resolve,
"the steady tension between the unique, contextually specific nature of
single sites, and the need to make sense across a number of sites".[2]
A focus on individual cases can result in very thin, if accurate,
generalizations, while excessive emphasis on case comparisons can produce
broad or even unfounded generalizations.
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In spite of the methodological shortcomings, the case
comparison approach was selected for this research. The limited number
of transit service disruptions occurring during the research period
ruled out the use of other, more extensive case survey approaches. The
case comparison approach to research is by no means perfect, but it can
produce valid results if it is applied with the appropriate caveats in
mind.
The cases examined in this study are discussed in light of
previous related research, and actual planning experiences are assessed
in terms of the extent to which they support the propositions suggested
in the first chapter. The cross-case analysis focuses on the planning
processes employed in each case in defining the characteristics common
to the cases studied and in developing a generalized planning framework.
It is this emphasis on process that permits generalizations to be made
across cases, because there are many institutional and procedural
characteristics common to transportation planning in most North American
urban areas. Still, the unique characteristics of each case are identi-
fied and even emphasized throughout this thesis, because ignoring them
would render the planning framework developed virtually useless in terms
of practical application to other transit service interruptions.
Although the case comparison approach should be used with caution, then,
the emphasis placed on the events specific to each situation in this
study should serve to limit the number of broad generalizations that are
derived.
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The three transit system disruptions selected for case study
were chosen primarily because they were the major disruptions occurring
during the research period. The April 1980 transit strike in New York
City, the December 1980 Boston transit system shutdown, and the March
1981 transit strike in Philadelphia all involved at least some effort on
the part of local authorities to make a response. Other transit system
shutdowns did indeed occur in other cities during this period, but they
were not included in this study because the impacts of the shutdowns on
the functioning of the urban areas involved were not significant enough
to warrant a contingency planning effort. New York, Boston, and Phila-
delphia are all major metropolitan areas that depend heavily on their
public transit systems. The impact of a disruption to transit service
on travel patterns, and the consequent need to take some sort of action
to minimize this impact made the contingency planning experiences in
these three cases essential to the development of a generalized response
planning framework.
2. The Case Studies Summarized
A. New York City, 1980
When the members of the local transit workers' union went out
on strike on April 1, 1980, all bus and subway services in New York City
ceased operations. The strike lasted for eleven days, leaving 6.2 mil-
lion daily transit riders without public transportation. To make
matters worse, another strike closed the Long Island Railroad commuter
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system at the same time, stranding another 250,000 commuters for its
two-day duration. The serious traffic congestion and general travel
chaos which could have occurred during the strikes was averted, however,
because City officials had prepared a contingency plan in the weeks
preceding the disruption. The Transit Strike Contingency Plan, together
with the preparatory efforts made for its implementation, enabled public
authorities to make a coordinated and effective response to the strike.
The foundation of the government-led response to the transit
strike was an Emergency Management Plan developed by the New York City
Mayor's Emergency Control Board (ECB). This Board had been partially
mobilized for potential emergencies in previous situations, but the 1980
transit strike was the first occasion on which it was fully tested and
its resources fully utilized. The Emergency Management Plan was a
general response framework developed for use in many different urban
emergencies and disruptions. Created because of a "need for a manage-
ment plan flexible enough for use in various contingencies", the Plan
focussed on the need for a rapid deployment of resources and direct
inter-agency communication during both metropolitan-wide and localized
emergencies or disruptions.[3]
The responsibility for implementing the procedures contained
in the Emergency Management Plan rested with two principal groups. The
Emergency Control Board itself, which included the Mayor, police
commissioner, and representatives from other City agencies and major
private organizations, was responsible for coordinating the use of
available City resources and for keeping the Mayor informed of all
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aspects of the emergency at hand. Another group, the Office of Civil
Preparedness (OCP) was responsible for monitoring daily events in a
crisis, for actually creating and updating the emergency procedures, for
contacting the agencies to be involved, for data collection, and for
providing centralized training to those implementing specific contingency
measures.
The first phase of the Emergency Management Plan involved the
activation of a monitoring system which was the basis for coordinating
the activities of these two groups. The monitoring phase basically
provided for preliminary assessment of any threatening crisis by the
staff of OCP so that appropriate response actions could be determined.
Once a crisis became certain, an Emergency Management Center, a command
post, was to be established to permit direct communication among the
agencies involved in the response effort. With representatives of each
involved agency or organization present at the Center, continual updates
or modifications to the Emergency Management Plan could be made.
The 1980 transit strike proved to be the first major metro-
politan-wide emergency to be dealt with under the response framework of
the Emergency Management Plan. As soon as the possibility of a transit
service disruption arose, the NYC Department of Transportation, the
Police Department, and the Mayor's Office of Operations began to prepare
a specific response plan for the strike. In preparing the Transit Strike
Contingency Plan, City officials first analyzed the impacts of the last
New York City transit strike (January 1966) on travel patterns, and the
efforts made to deal with it. In 1966, the basis of the contingency
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response was the use of traffic engineering measures designed to accom-
modate as many extra vehicles as possible on the existing street network.
Changes to the overall transportation policy environment and increasing
central area congestion in the intervening years, however, forced
planners to develop measures in 1980 which would expedite the movement
of people, rather than vehicles.[4] Contingency actions for the 1980
strike therefore focussed on promoting the use of high-occupancy vehicles
such as buses, vans, and carpools, and imposing restrictions on the use
of single-occupant private automobiles in the core area.
Those agencies and groups to be responsible for implementing
the various components of the Transit Strike Contingency Plan were
notified a full two months before the anticipated strike deadline, when
the Mayor's Office of Operations mailed a list of specific tasks and
responsibilities to approximately thirty agencies on the Emergency
Control Board. The Plan was focussed on the "maintenance of emergency
services, providing exclusive routes for the remaining public transpor-
tation operations, maximizing the efficiency of the city's arterial
roadways, and keeping the accumulation of vehicles in Manhattan to a
manageable level".15] The specific measures included in the plan are
listed in Exhibit 2-1.
The Emergency Management Center had the responsibility for
implementing these contingency actions and monitoring their effects.
There, City officials monitored travel data such as traffic volumes
during peak periods, as well as data collected in surveys of mode of
travel and employee absenteeism. The information collected was used to
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1. MAINTENANCE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ROUTES
A. Reserved lanes and streets for emergency vehicles
2. CONTROLLING VEHICLE CONGESTION IN MANHATTAN
A. Vehicle occupancy restrictions of three or more persons per vehicle
B. Peak period lane reversals on major access routes
C. Stricter police enforcement of traffic regulations
D. Grid-lock prevention and monitoring
3. IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARTERIAL ROADS
A. Priority lanes and roadways for vehicles with three or more occupants
B. Adjust computerized traffic signal control system
C. Implement and enforce "no standing" regulations
4. PARKING MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
A. Provide carpool staging areas
B. Special carpool parking areas in core
C. Suspension of alternate side of the street parking privileges
D. Increase number of public parking spaces available in core
E. Encourage increased private parking facilities
5. OTHER TRANSPORTATION MEASURES
A. Special bicycle routes and separate bike lanes in core area
B. Increase passenger ferry operations
C. Allow taxi group riding in Manhattan
D. Request additional gasoline allocation for metropolitan area
E. Encourage staggered work hours and/or four-day work weeks
F. Increase tow truck operations
G. Suspend non-essential road repair operations
EXHIBIT 2-1: TRANSPORTATION MEASURES INCLUDED IN NEW YORK'S TRANSIT
STRIKE CONTINGENCY PLAN, 1980
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deal with unanticipated problems arising during the strike, as the
original measures in the plan had to be modified to respond to changing
circumstances. As it turned out, actions to relieve specific problems
such as underutilized bridges or unusually long queues at tunnel
entrances were implemented frequently during the strike.[6]
Once the strike began, City officials concentrated their
efforts on implementing and maintaining the response actions of the
transit strike plan. Little explicit effort went into exercising any
direct control over how the public would cope with the strike by
organizing carpools, chartering buses, or requiring private businesses
to undertake specific actions. Such activities were basically left to
the initiative of private companies, although the Mayor did encourage
businesses to organize their own pools and implement staggered work
hours to minimize congestion during peak periods. The City's major role
was the maintenance of emergency and municipal services and an orderly
flow of traffic during the strike.[7]
Private businesses did in fact respond to encouragement from
the Mayor. The Manhattan banks and financial companies, for example,
established a form of transportation brokerage operation to charter
buses in order to ensure the continued operation of the financial dis-
trict. Most businesses seemed reluctant, however, to stagger work hours
and/or go on four-day work weeks. Those agreeing to the measures sug-
gested by City officials were not able to fully implement them before
the end of the 11-day strike.
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Advance planning for the transit strike, based on the estab-
lished procedures of the Emergency Management Plan, unquestionably
reduced the impact of the strike on commuters. While the number of
people arriving by car into Manhattan during the morning peaks of the
strike (460,000) was twice the daily average, the number of vehicle
entries remained at near-normal levels, due primarily to the auto oc-
cupancy restrictions imposed in the core area.[8] Travel timing was
also affected, with the morning rush beginning much earlier during the
strike, although the peak period did not extend significantly later into
the evenings. As well, person-per-vehicle figures were much higher than
usual during the first week of the strike, and still higher during the
second week. During the morning peaks, traffic on most major arterial
and cross-town streets was observed moving at near-normal speeds.
Finally, the use of special bikelanes in Manhattan increased signifi-
cantly during the strike.
Several of the transportation measures employed during the
strike have been maintained, or recommended for maintenance, as more
permanent components of the New York City transportation network. An
evaluation of the transportation innovations used in the crisis situa-
tion was prepared by the NYC Department of Transportation, and concluded
that "the success of the various measures ... suggests certain techniques
which can be adopted to relieve congestion and provide for a more
efficient public transportation network".[9] Two transportation mea-
sures - exclusive lanes on Madison Avenue reserved for buses, taxis and
delivery vehicles during peak periods, and physically separate bicycle
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lanes on a major street - were implemented as a direct result of their
success during the transit strike. As well, many of the traffic flow
improvements to roadways made for the strike were retained. Studies of
more extensive transportation programs, such as high-occupancy auto
restrictions on major bridges during peak periods, and taxi group riding
or jitney services in the CBD, were also done in the wake of experiences
during the strike.
Overall, the efforts made to anticipate and deal with the
effects of a transit strike in New York City did seem to reduce the
impact of the disruption on urban travel. Extensive planning for imple-
menting a response to a transit shutdown, done under the existing
planning framework of the Emergency Management Plan, illustrated the
potential of a well-prepared and coordinated transportation emergency
plan. The process of plan preparation and implementation was a remark-
ably smooth one, due to several factors.[10] City officials knew that,
because up to 87 percent of all person-trips entering or leaving Manhat-
tan used some form of public transit, some action on their part was
required to keep the strike from paralyzing the city's transportation
network. They also realized that the strike threat was real and began
planning for the strike deadline well in advance.
The Emergency Management Plan framework was already in place
when planning for the 1980 strike began, allowing planners to effectively
coordinate the actions of those agencies most likely to be involved in
responding to the crisis. When the contingency actions were being
implemented, public support for the City and its stance on the transit
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strike issue served to minimize resistance to the more stringent of the
transportation measures. Finally, large numbers of police and enforce-
ment personnel deployed during the strike ensured correct implementation
of, and compliance with, the contingency measures of the plan.
The contingency measures included in the plan, on the whole,
seemed to work well, particularly those measures involving auto occupancy
restrictions and bicycle traffic. Efforts to encourage private busi-
nesses to adjust their work schedules and establish their own transpor-
tation programs were not as successful both because the City did not
devote great efforts to private businesses and employees per se, and
because the Mayor's encouragement of such measures came too late for
most companies to implement them during the 11-day strike.
The New York City contingency planning experience serves as a
model for government-led response to transit service disruptions in many
ways. From the establishment of a general emergency response framework
in the form of the Emergency Management Plan, through the actual en-
forcement of contingency measures at street level, the strike response
effort was, for the most part, effective in mitigating some of the
hardships associated with the transit strike.
B. Boston, 1980
In early 1980, many officials in Boston began to realize that
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), the transit
agency serving 275,000 daily commuters in the Boston metropolitan area,
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was in such financial difficulty that a shutdown of its operations due
to lack of funds was becoming a distinct possibility. The MBTA was
spending its allotted operating budget at a rate that would leave it
without funds by November 1980. Unlike previous years when local of-
ficials approved supplemental budgets to tide the MBTA over, increasing
political pressure to reduce taxes meant that continued tax revenue
support of an agency perceived to be grossly inefficient was highly
unlikely.
By June, it was becoming apparent that a major political
battle over the MBTA would likely occur in the late fall, but City
officials were at that point not yet fully convinced that a financial
crisis could lead to a total system shutdown. The Chamber of Commerce
received a proposal to develop a business-based strategy for coping with
a possible shutdown from a consumer group involved with public transpor-
tation. The proposal stated that "a political stalemate has developed
between competing interests ... in this environment, very little is
being accomplished, thus there is a need for private action".[11] The
proposal was rejected at that time, but was resubmitted to the Chamber
in October, when a shutdown appeared more certain. The Chamber, in an
effort to avoid taking sides on what had developed into a volatile
political issue, again decided not to sponsor the planning effort.
By mid-October, City officials themselves became concerned
about a possible shutdown and decided to begin a contingency planning
process. A "Transit Emergency Task Force" was established to guide the
planning process. Members of the Task Force were selected by the
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Mayor's Office from the private sector rather than from City staff so
that its planning activities could be insulated as much as possible from
the politics of the rapidly developing crisis. City personnel, however,
did serve as technical staff to the task force and, in essence, developed
the contingency measures for subsequent approval by the Task Force
members.[12]
Several characteristics of the contingency planning process
adopted in Boston merit special note. First, because plan preparation
was delayed until a shutdown seemed imminent, there was very little time
to do any detailed analysis of existing travel patterns in Boston, or of
the expected impacts of any alternative transportation actions. The
recommended contingency actions were based on estimates of the number of
MBTA riders that would require alternate means to get to the Boston
downtown area, and an assessment of what restrictions should be placed
on travel in order to accommodate the extra traffic burden on the street
network. Based on traffic volume data supplied by the Police Department,
planners concluded that with three or more people in each car entering
the central business district, the additional traffic flow could be
handled.
Boston planners also made use of the New York experience with
its Transit Strike Contingency Plan, with respect to both the transpor-
tation measures used and the travel data collected. The measures and
the expected travel impacts had to be adapted to the Boston situation,
different not only in its street configuration, but also in terms of the
season in which the shutdown occurred. For example, planners had to
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consider the fact that any staggering of work hours in the Boston
situation would have to take into account the early darkness of the
winter months.[13]
The agencies to be responsible for implementation - the
police department, traffic and parking department, and the public works
department - played a major role in the planning process by reacting to
the proposed actions and modifying them when appropriate. In fact, once
the contents of the plan had been finalized by the Task Force, it was
turned over to the implementing agencies, and the planners originally
responsible for it virtually lost track of how it would ultimately be
implemented.[14] The analysis of alternative transportation actions by
Boston planners was thus relatively simple, made use of available data
sources, and was substantially influenced by the implementing agencies.
The importance of the role played by implementing agencies in
the plan preparation process is highlighted by the participation of the
Boston police department. Apart from being responsible for implementing
and enforcing many of the emergency transportation actions to be used,
Boston police also influenced the types of actions considered, and
essentially established the overall goal of the plan. Police told con-
tingency planners that the central area streets would not be able to
handle more than a ten percent increase in peak-hour traffic volumes
without serious congestion problems. Keeping the increase in traffic
volumes to less than ten percent thus became the goal of the entire plan
preparation process.
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Another major characteristic of the process was the involve-
ment of the business community. The Task Force itself consisted of
representatives of the private sector. When meetings were held to brief
the business community about the plan's components, downtown retailers
became involved and voiced their concerns about the impact of a shutdown
on Christmas season shopping, and felt that publicizing the existence of
a contingency plan could scare potential shoppers away from the downtown
area.[15] Most major employers were skeptical about the plan, however,
and had prepared their own measures to get employees to and from work
(e.g. shuttle bus services). The actual transportation measures recom-
mended in the City-prepared plan were grouped into three categories, as
shown in Exhibit 2-2.
These transportation measures focussed on accommodating the
expected increase in traffic from suburban areas, while little was of-
fered to those living in the inner city. This problem was recognized by
the Task Force, but the planners involved argued that there had been very
little time to explore all the available options in detail. For example,
they had considered subsidizing private bus operators to provide service
along major inner city MBTA bus routes. Such an action would have
required extensive negotiations with bus companies, and a close exami-
nation of the legal and financial constraints on establishing the
service. Given the limited amount of time available for preparation,
such actions were not feasible.
The planning process in Boston was characterized by jurisdic-
tion-specific actions. Although the city of Boston and 78 additional
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1. CONTROLLING AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC
A. Impose vehicle occupancy restrictions in core area during peak hours
B. Encourage establishment of staggered or flexible work hours
C. Use fringe parking lots as staging areas for ridesharing
D. Open downtown parking facilities earlier
E. Utilize a peak-flow one-way traffic network in the core area
F. Enforce on-street parking restrictions more stringently
G. Restrict deliveries between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m. in core area
2. PROMOTING USE OF OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES
A. Expand handicapped and elderly transportation services
B. Account for increased walking and bicycling into the core area
C. Allow taxi group riding
D. Permit private bus operators to expand services
E. Establish passenger ferry operations
3. ENLISTING SUPPORT OF THE DOWNTOWN COMMUNITY
A. Encourage large employers to modify work hours and to establish
ridesharing programs
B. Coordinate downtown retail hours to minimize peak travel periods
C. Use media to publicize plan details
EXHIBIT 2-2: TRANSPORTATION MEASURES PROPOSED BY BOSTON'S TRANSIT
EMERGENCY TASK FORCE, 1980
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surrounding cities and towns are served by the MBTA, only Boston and a
few adjacent communities seriously planned for the shutdown. It was not
until three days before the anticipated date of the shutdown that repre-
sentatives of the concerned communities met to discuss the actions to be
taken.[16] It was realized at this meeting that some of the proposed
actions could create conflicts among the jurisdictions involved.
Boston's plan to turn back all cars with less than three occupants at
the central area boundary was of great concern to officials from
neighboring communities, who envisioned massive parking and congestion
problems in the neighborhoods immediately adjacent to this boundary.
The absence of a metropolitan-wide planning effort in the
Boston case can be explained in several ways. First, there is no single
agency which acts as the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for
the area. Instead, coordination of the transportation planning process
is provided by a committee of the heads of seven different transporta-
tion agencies. Second, those agencies that could have provided a broader
perspective, the State transportation agency for example, were embroiled
in the political battle over the MBTA. Because the financial crisis
pitted the Governor against the cities and towns, and Boston in parti-
cular, cooperation from agencies under the Governor's control was
unlikely.
The politics of the crisis leading to a possible MBTA shut-
down were so important to all those involved that the product of the
planning effort, the contingency plan, itself became a political weapon.
As the shutdown date approached, the Task Force fully expected that
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their plan would be released to the public well in advance to prepare it
for the actions to be implemented. However, the plan was not made pub-
lic for a number of reasons, including the Mayor's decision to wait and
see whether the Governor would use his "emergency powers" to take over
operation of the MBTA. During the entire plan preparation process,
then, the planning effort could not be divorced from the politics of the
crisis at hand. While the analysis of available transportation measures
was more or less sheltered from political influence, the product of the
contingency planning process was as much a political document as it was
a response plan.
In summary, the contingency planning process for the transit
system shutdown in Boston demonstrated the relationship between response
planning and the political nature of a crisis. A group outside of the
City government initially proposed the development of a contingency plan.
When the Mayor's Office finally decided to start a plan preparation
process, a private sector task force was created to lead the effort.
Analysis for the plan was very simple, and the plan's -components were
heavily influenced by implementing agencies. The business community was
also important in the process, although many major businesses decided to
pursue their own methods of coping with a shutdown. Finally, the
politics of the very crisis which created the need for a contingency
plan had a significant impact on how the plan was ultimately used.
The MBTA did shut down for one day during the first weekend
of December 1980, and the City at that time announced its contingency
plan would take effect the following Monday. By Sunday, however, the
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State Legislature had passed legislation to keep the system running for
the rest of the year, meaning the plan was not implemented. Still, the
planning effort was not a total loss, as the contingency plan which was
developed is now considered to be the basis of any future contingency
response.[17] Planners are also examining some of the transportation
measures suggested for the crisis which received a favorable reception
(e.g. changes to taxi regulations to permit group riding). As well, at
least one City official viewed the planning effort as successful in en-
couraging greater business community participation in urban transporta-
tion planning in general. The crisis and the contingency planning effort
thus provided increased opportunities for innovative transportation
actions, opportunities which otherwise may not have occurred.
C. Philadelphia, 1981
When the transit workers went out on strike against the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA) on March 15, 1981,
Philadelphia became the third major American metropolitan area to
experience a transit system shutdown in less than a year. As was the
case with the interruptions in New York and Boston, the Philadelphia
strike involved a local government response in the form of contingency
transportation measures. Unlike Boston and New York, however, the
public agency response in Philadelphia was not nearly as extensive, as
greater emphasis was placed on the public's past experiences with
transit disruptions, and on private initiatives for coping with the
strike. As well, the availability of alternative mass transportation in
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the metropolitan area meant that fewer explicit transportation actions
were required.
The walkout by 5,000 transit workers halted bus, trolley, and
subway services, forcing 400,000 commuters to find other modes of
travel. In general, public opinion and media support were behind SEPTA
management's efforts to curb excessive union demands. With headlines
proclaiming, "Neither Side Optimistic as SEPTA Strike Talks Stall",
commuters anticipated an extended transit service disruption as the
strike began.[18] The strike in fact continued for 19 days before SEPTA
management effectively backed down on demands for part-time workers in
return for wage concessions on the part of the union. Over the course
of the disruption, picketers managed to shut down Conrail commuter
operations for one day, New Jersey Transit suburban bus services on
another, and attempted to close down a major expressway into the city.
The possibility that a transit strike would occur in mid-
March first became a concern to City officials in December 1980, when
the Mayor's Office notified the Office of the Managing Director that a
disruption of transit operations could be expected. The City, under the
direction of the Deputy Managing Director, in turn assembled a steering
committee to lead the preparation process. It first met in late
January, and several times thereafter. The City's agencies and the
Mayor's Office thus led the contingency planning effort, and made pre-
parations under the assumption that a strike would indeed occur.
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An informal emergency response framework had evolved in
Philadelphia as a result of previous transit strikes in 1975 and 1977,
and from experiences with disruptions to transit services caused by
special events such as World Series victory celebrations and the visit
of the Pope. In the event of any serious disruption to public services,
the City's Managing Director acted as the emergency coordinator, with
all other involved City agencies and departments reporting to him. The
entire contingency planning process for the 1981 strike thus relied
heavily on past experiences with similar disruptions. Four major groups
became directly involved in developing the City's response to a possible
strike: the Mayor's Office, the Office of the Managing Director, the
Police Commissioner's Office, and the Chamber of Commerce. Although the
planning activities did exhibit some inter-agency coordination and
communication, each agency was relatively independent in its efforts, so
that the role of each is best discussed separately.
The Office of the Managing Director did not perceive a poten-
tial transit strike as being a "crisis" situation, but began planning
for a shutdown 4 to 6 weeks before the labor contract was to expire. As
part of the process, the City undertook a parking inventory to determine
the car capacity of the central area, and asked its departments to
survey all City employees with respect to their journey-to-work
patterns. [19]
The major goal of the actions selected was to keep as many
cars as possible out of the CBD during a strike. To this end, the
contingency plan included the provision of remote parking areas for
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carpooling into the downtown, and an information "hotline" for the pub-
lic to call with their travel problems. As well, the City planned to
use relaxed enforcement of certain parking regulations on downtown
streets as one method of increasing total parking capacity. While these
actions were directed toward the general public, the primary focus of
many of the City-planned actions was to facilitate the travel of City
employees to and from work. All City-owned vehicles were made available
for pooling purposes, and flexible work hours were established. It was
the intent of the City to play a leadership role in this situation by
demonstrating how one of Philadelphia's largest employers could respond
to a transit strike.
The actions which the City planned to implement were judged
to be adequate because of certain characteristics of the Philadelphia
metropolitan area that had reduced the level of impact of previous
strikes. Most important of these was the presence of alternative mass
transportation modes. Conrail commuter raillines, the PATCO high-speed
line, and several suburban bus companies could continue to provide
fairly extensive service during a strike.
Although not directly involved in the plan development
stages, the Mayor's Office did review the proposed actions and assisted
in implementing the response.[20] For example, the Mayor's Office con-
tacted the streets department to ensure that parking regulations could
be changed efficiently, and the Chamber of Commerce was informed
directly that a strike appeared to be inevitable and that major employers
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should prepare their own contingency actions.
The Mayor personally avoided the negotiation process, al-
though he did feel that it would be preferable to avoid a strike. He
did not become involved in the issue because media and public support
was already behind SEPTA, and his silence would imply support for SEPTA
as well. The Mayor was more concerned over the impact of a shutdown on
downtown retailers and transit dependents, and was also aware of the
fact that any City-sponsored actions designed to supply alternative
transportation services could be viewed as a form of strike-breaking.
The financial realities of the SEPTA issue were also a concern, as there
appeared to be a growing need for some form of regional transit tax to
fund SEPTA operations. The Mayor's Office was thus more concerned over
political and long-range issues surrounding the strike. While fully
aware of the contingency planning process, the Mayor's Office relied on
the expertise of the Office of the Managing Director to develop the
actual plan.
The Office of the Managing Director coordinated all City
departments and agencies, and kept the Police Department informed of the
actions required. The Police Department's plan for a strike response
was essentially an updated version of the 1975 and 1977 strike plans.
The Department used more recent data on parking facilities and their
capacities, traffic volumes, and congestion in the update process. The
specific components of the Police Department response, both before and
during the actual strike, included:[21]
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(1) a detailed inventory of central city parking,
both on- and off-street;
(2) an assessment of the need for special police
control of access to/from downtown lots; and
(3) increased traffic patrols in the CBD to keep
intersections clear.
As well, throughout the strike, police would monitor traffic conditions
during peak periods, both from the ground and from the air.
As part of its response to the strike, the Chamber of Com-
merce was able to make use of "Operation Alert", a framework used for
informing major employers of possible transportation disruptions,
ranging from severe weather conditions to transit strikes.[22] In pre-
paration for the 1981 transit strike, the Transportation Council of the
Chamber sent out information packages to all employers with 100 or more
employees about two weeks before the strike deadline. The packages
described which transportation services would be affected and encouraged
employers to establish flex-time and ridesharing programs, not only in
response to the strike, but in order to promote these concepts in
general.
The Chamber of Commerce undertook this effort to help private
employers because, during previous disruptions, there had been little
interaction or coordination between the City government and the business
community. It had become apparent that the City was once again dealing
primarily with getting its own employees to work, forcing the Chamber to
encourage private businesses on its own. While most firms had been able
to respond well during previous disruptions, there was some feeling at
54.
the Chamber that the City could have done more in the way of coordina-
ting the response process.
The transit strike actually began on a Sunday, meaning that
the public had at least a day to prepare for the Monday morning commute,
and that the City could publicize its contingency actions without fear
of influencing the negotiations. Unfortunately, references in the
Sunday papers to a relaxation of parking regulations in the downtown
area were misinterpreted both by the public and by enforcement officials.
The result was a "ticket fiasco" on the first workday of the strike,
when police towed and ticketed as usual. City officials attributed the
confusion to a misunderstanding on the part of the media, who seemed to
think that there would be no enforcement, and to poor communication
within the Police Department itself. Police officials, on the other
hand, insisted that the announcement did not come from their department,
and that they would have preferred to increase parking enforcement during
the strike to improve road capacities. The Deputy Police Commissioner
felt that the people actually enforcing should be the ones to announce
such policies, because "they would know what to say, and how to say
it".[23]
Apart from the confusion over parking enforcement, Philadel-
phia commuters appeared to cope fairly well with the inconvenience of
the strike, and most of the actions prepared by the City were successful
in their objectives. The use of privately-owned empty lots for carpool
staging was substantial, City-owned vehicles were used for ridesharing,
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and staggered work hours helped spread the peak periods of congestion.
The Office of the Managing Director monitored reports of absenteeism in
City departments, and received detailed traffic updates every 30 minutes
during rush hours. Overall, there was a feeling that the strike could
have gone on indefinitely without severely affecting the operations and
services-of City departments. Except for additional overtime expenses
for traffic patrols, the Police Department was not overtaxed during the
strike either. The basic philosophy of the Police Commissioner with
respect to the strike seemed to hold true, that "people should help
themselves" with a minimum of official guidance.
Data collected by the Chamber of Commerce during the strike
appear to support the position that past experiences with transit strikes
made the public more ready to adapt their travel behavior (see Exhibit
2-3). The comparison of absenteeism and tardiness during the 1977 and
1981 strikes shows how the public can learn to cope with a disruption.
The figures for retail sales, on the other hand, highlight the extent to
which downtown retailers were affected by this and previous strikes. In
fact, major downtown department stores and a shopping mall were forced
to shorten their business hours due to poor sales during the 1981
strike. Overall, while the city seemed to cope well in terms of traffic
flow and commuting patterns, downtown businesses could not afford to
continue absorbing the sales losses, and those dependent on transit
began to reach the point at which optional trips could no longer be
deferred.
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1977 STRIKE
(44 days in length)
First
Day
Final
Week
1981 STRIKE
(19 days in length)
First
Day
First
Week
EMPLOYEE ABSENTEEISM AND TARDINESS
Increase in absenteeism
Inrease in tardiness
DOWNTOWN RETAIL SALES
Decrease in sales
3 %
7 %
43 %
0.25 %
1.5 %
28 %
Source: Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce
EXHIBIT 2-3: PHILADELPHIA TRANSIT STRIKE STATISTICS
0.5 %
5 %
N.A.
0.25 %
2 %
45 %
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As the strike ended, City officials felt that the principal
permanent effect of the contingency planning process and the strike
would likely be an overall ridership loss for SEPTA because of the
public's ability to fare so well without transit. Otherwise, most of
the temporary transportation measures were discontinued. City-owned
vehicles were returned to normal use because the City felt it could "not
afford to be in competition with mass transit".[24] The carpool staging
areas could not be maintained because they involved primarily privately-
owned vacant parcels of land. Police officials felt that one long-term
result of the experience would be more police control over traffic and
enforcement policies and planning during future disruptions.
In retrospect, both the Deputy Managing Director and the
Deputy Police Commissioner felt that it was fortunate that there existed
at least a framework of past response plans on which the 1981 plan
could be based. Experiences during past disruptions also permitted the
establishment of a response communications network both within City Hall
and among other involved agencies. Unfortunately, although the communi-
cation and coordination framework existed in principle, and although it
may have functioned among the City departments, it did not receive a
great deal of praise from either the Police Department or the Chamber of
Commerce. The parking enforcement confusion demonstrated that there
were some problems with the system. Both police officials and Chamber
representatives would have preferred closer coordination between the
Office of the Managing Director and their respective agencies.
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In summary, it would appear that the combination of experi-
ence with past disruptions and the unique transportation system
characteristics of the Philadelphia metropolitan area allowed a less
detailed and less comprehensive contingency planning effort to be, in
the end, fairly effective. An informal response planning framework is
evolving in Philadelphia, and the errors committed in responding to the
1981 strike should serve to improve it. While the relevant agencies in
Philadelphia are still far from the Emergency Management Plan concept of
New York City, improved coordination and communication among the agencies
will move the Philadelphia contingency planning process another step in
that direction.
Different types of response effort were made in the different
situations examined, both because of variations in the contexts in which
the disruptions.actually occurred, and because those involved in pre-
paring the response plans chose to follow different approaches. The
next three chapters of this thesis examine the planning efforts on a
comparative basis, in terms of the planning process undertaken, the
actual plan developed and implemented, and finally, the permanent ef-
fects of the contingency planning efforts that remained after each dis-
ruption had passed. In each of the chapters, an effort is made to
relate the actual contingency planning experiences in the three situa-
tions to the past research outlined in Chapter One, and conclusions are
made with respect to the validity of the propositions suggested.
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Throughout this effort to reach generalized conclusions with respect to
events before, during, and after a transit service interruption, dif-
ferences among the planning efforts attributable to explicit choices
made by planners are distinguished from differences attributable to the
specific context of each disruption.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROCESS OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING
In each of the case studies described in the previous chapter,
the disruptive impacts of a transit system shutdown were to some extent
mitigated by the existence of a contingency plan prepared in advance of
the expected service disruption. There were, however, substantial dif-
ferences in the approaches used to prepare and implement the transporta-
tion contingency measures for the three disruptions. Consequently,
there were also differences in the extent to which the contingency
measures prepared were successful in helping commuters to cope with the
disruptions in the two cases where contingency actions were actually
implemented.
The transit stoppages examined demonstrate how the relative
success of a contingency planning effort can be affected not only by the
specific actions selected for implementation, but by several aspects of
the planning process as well. The characteristics of the organizations
involved in the process, the nature of the inter-organizational
relationships in existence before and during the planning stages, and
the manner in which the contingency plan is formulated and implemented
are all aspects of the planning process that can ultimately determine
the success of a response effort. In an effort to identify some of the
more salient characteristics of an "effective" contingency planning
process, several of the more important issues to be dealt with in the
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response planning phase are examined separately in this chapter. For
each issue, actual experiences from the case studies are used to illus-
trate its importance to an effective response plan preparation effort.
1. Unexpected Disruptions and Organizational Decision-Making
One fundamental reason for planning a response to a transit
stoppage involves the decision- or policy-making functions of those
organizations to be affected by the disruption. The first proposition
made in Chapter One suggests that the existence of an actual response
plan can help reduce the element of surprise associated with a disrup-
tion, the workload associated with the formulation of emergency response
actions, and the general level of uncertainty or confusion over its
exact role in the response effort for an involved agency. By defining
in advance the strategy the agency will follow in the event of a service
interruption, a contingency plan should serve to minimize the number of
policy decisions to be made under crisis-like conditions.
In the contingency planning efforts studied, two of the major
benefits of the contingency planning process realized by individual
agencies involved in the response efforts were: (1) simply, an aware-
ness of the possibility of a transit stoppage well in advance, enabling
the agencies to make internal preparations; and (2) a knowledge of its
responsibilities once the disruption in fact occurred. The advance
warning provided by participation in a contingency planning process
proved to be of differing value to the organizations involved, depending
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on the various contexts in which the disruptions occurred. In the two
transit labor strike cases, the termination dates of the existing labor
contracts provided fairly accurate target dates for the response
planning process. Certainty about the strike dates in New York and
Philadelphia permitted at least the lead organizations to initiate the
planning process a full two months before the disruption in both cases.
In Boston, although the possibility of a system shutdown was
recognized by a consumer group six months in advance, plan preparation
was not initiated until the Mayor formed the Task Force four weeks prior
to the eventual shutdown. Uncertainty over whether the shutdown would
even occur, combined with a desire to keep the contingency planning pro-
cess out of the political debate over MBTA funding, kept Boston's Mayor
from committing himself to a response effort any earlier. The volatile
political environment of the Boston crisis further reduced the advance-
notice benefits of response preparation, with State government agencies
too involved in the political debate to be invited to participate in the
process, and agencies in surrounding jurisdictions not being notified of
the Plan until three days before the shutdown. The politics of the
Boston shutdown were such that, had the contingency plan been actually
implemented, only selected agencies from Boston that had knowledge of
the process would have benefitted from the advance preparations.
Two factors seemed to increase the advance-notice benefits
the individual agencies were able to derive from a contingency planning
process. The first was, clearly, the willingness of the lead agency
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responsible for the effort, the Mayor's Offices in the cases studied, to
publicly recognize the possibility of a future disruption and to commit
itself to a planning effort well in advance of the shutdown date.
Factors reducing this willingness included the political sensitivity of
the specific issue behind the transit system shutdown at hand and the
presence of other powerful agencies or organizations with a stake in
either the shutdown issue, or in urban transportation issues in general.
The political considerations arising during these crises are discussed
in detail in Chapter Six.
The second factor contributing to the value of the advance
notice to an organization is the involvement of that organization in the
planning process itself. If an agency has not been made aware of and
been involved in the process of response planning, it cannot be expected
to prepare itself effectively for the disruption on the spur of the
moment, even if it is handed a well-defined set of specific responsibi-
lities by the contingency planning team. For an individual organization
that is to be affected by a service stoppage, participation in the
contingency planning process can better prepare its members for adapting
its operating routines to the disruption, as well as providing the
organization with a definite list of responsibilities or tasks to be
carried out during the disruption.
In the cases examined, the presence of a contingency plan did
in fact facilitate the implementation of response measures by the
agencies involved. The response tasks assigned to individual agencies
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stood a better chance of being implemented when adequate advance notice
was given. Even when specific tasks were not assigned, the knowledge of
a potential shutdown enabled agencies to make their own response prepara-
tions, as was the case in Philadelphia. Overall, the agencies that were
able to benefit most from the contingency planning processes were those
that had been directly involved in the planning efforts. This involve-
ment depended a great deal, however, on the willingness of a lead agency
to commit itself to contingency planning, a factor heavily influenced by
the politics of the given situation.
2. Response Planning and Inter-Agency Coordination
Just as the operating routines of individual agencies tend to
be negatively affected during disruptions, the explicit or implicit
relationships among the many agencies and organizations likely to suffer
the effects of a transit system shutdown can also be affected by such a
disruption to routine. If there are no provisions made for inter-agency
coordination prior to a service stoppage, the response actions taken by
different interests can affect one another, and in some cases even
contradict one another. The interrelationships among the interests of
the many agencies likely to be involved in a response, and the conse-
quent linkages among the response actions to be implemented, make the
process of inter-agency coordination a primary objective of any
contingency planning effort.
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The literature reviewed in Chapter One suggests that the
traditional response of organizations faced with a potential disruption
to their routine is the formation of an ad-hoc committee for the purpose
of overall response coordination. This same literature, however,
indicates that such ad-hoc committees have proven to be inferior in the
quality of decisions made, the utilization of available resources, and
in overall creativity in formulating a response to a crisis situation
than established policy-making groups.[1] The potential for innovative
solutions to disruptions is reduced in ad-hoc committee deliberations
because committee members, unfamiliar with each other, tend to resolve
conflicts through compromise, so that, in many cases, the "best"
alternatives may not even be considered.
The second proposition made with respect to contingency
planning in Chapter One suggests that a structured response planning
process can provide a forum for the coordination of proposed response
measures among the agencies to be involved, and can in fact create what
is in essence a new decision-making unit able to function during a dis-
ruption as a coordinating body that is somewhat more established than an
ad-hoc committee. A task force composed of representatives of the major
interests to be involved in the response effort should in principle be
able to formulate a coordinated response plan, and in the process reduce
the potential for serious inter-agency conflict during the response
effort.
The New York City case study provides perhaps the best
example of how a policy-making body created especially for the purpose
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of coordinating agency responses to unexpected disruptions can be the
basis of an effective contingency planning effort. There, the Emergency
Control Board, composed of representatives from both public agencies and
private interests, was able to develop a coordinated response plan. The
formation of the Board to deal with any urban emergency, well before the
possibility of a transit strike arose, permitted an inter-agency rapport
to be established. This relationship among the many agencies on the
Emergency Control Board meant that, when the Transit Strike Contingency
Plan had to be developed, the agencies involved were familiar with the
procedures to be followed, and were willing to become participants in a
response effort.
The willingness of the many agencies in a metropolitan area
to become involved in a coordinated response planning effort can be
influenced by several factors. A very basic influence is the level of
certainty associated with the occurrence of a transit service disruption.
The more predictable the start of a transit system shutdown, and the
greater the threatened impact of the shutdown on the agency concerned,
the greater the pressure on that agency to cooperate in response plan-
ning.
The ability of one agency to take a leadership role in the
planning and response process is another factor affecting inter-agency
coordination. In the two cases involving labor contract disputes, the
respective Mayor's offices assumed the dominant roles in response plan
preparation. As a result, they were able to exercise direct authority
over the City departments and agencies to be involved, and had a certain
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amount of influence over other local interests and private organizations
as well. Coordination of response activities with other jurisdictions
in the metropolitan area still presented a problem, but the general
legitimacy of the authority of the central city Mayor's Office, at least
at the local level, seemed to promote inter-agency cooperation in both
Philadelphia and New York City.
The political atmosphere which tends to accompany a transit
labor contract dispute can also be an influence on the level of inter-
agency cooperation that can be expected. In both New York and Philadel-
phia, public opinion and media support were generally behind the
positions of the respective transit managements. The "villain" was
perceived by the public, justifiably or not, as the transit union.
Public opinion in these cases helped to encourage local agencies to
cooperate in planning and implementing a strike response, and promoted
more of a unified spirit among both groups and individuals coping with
the disruptions.
Interviews with agency representatives in Philadelphia, how-
ever, suggested that the Mayor's Office and the City agencies planning
for the strike did not take full advantage of this favorable climate for
coordinating their response effort. Although City officials did make an
effort to involve the Police Department and the local Chamber of
Commerce, officials at the Chamber felt that more pre-strike communica-
tion would have been desirable. The lack of inter-agency coordination
forced the Chamber to make preparations for the strike on its own.
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In New York, while the favorable political climate also
seemed to have a positive effect on inter-agency coordination of
contingency responses, it was the leadership role assumed by the Mayor's
Office that appeared to have the greatest influence on effective co-
ordination. The Emergency Management Plan, established by the Mayor's
Office well before a transit strike was a threat, provided the basis for
inter-agency coordination. Diverse public and private interests had been
involved first in the development of the emergency management framework,
and then in the formulation of a response plan specific to the 1980
strike. The early involvement of virtually all the agencies to be
involved in a transit strike response, when combined with the effects of
a strong lead agency operating under a favorable political climate,
encouraged the responding agencies to coordinate their activities.
Transit system shutdowns resulting from funding crises can be
substantially more complicated in terms of inter-agency cooperation in
planning a response. The Boston experience demonstrated how the
political environment in which a disruption occurs can serve to hinder
inter-agency coordination. There, the Mayor's Office established a
contingency planning task force once a shutdown became imminent. How-
ever, the highly adversarial political debate over the future of MBTA
funding meant that the relevant agencies of most of the other cities and
towns in the metropolitan area, and agencies of the State government in
particular, were not included in the planning effort. Some of these
other agencies would not have participated even if they had been
invited. State government agencies, for example, had no interest in
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planning for an event that would occur only if the Governor could not
reach a compromise with the "opposing" parties - the localities of the
region, and the City of Boston in particular.
The Mayor's Office in Boston, therefore, was left only with
the authority and influence to lead the preparation of contingency
actions to be used by those agencies directly under its control. This
meant that, when a shutdown occurred, the actions could only be
implemented within the city boundaries. The Boston Police Department
was to be the primary implementing agency in the event of a shutdown,
and although efforts were made to contact other police departments in
the metropolitan area, other jurisdictions generally did not become
involved, partly because of the political climate, and partly because of
the complexity of coordinating close to a hundred jurisdictions in a
response effort. The effects of this lack of inter-jurisdictional
coordination on the actual response cannot be evaluated, unfortunately,
since the Boston plan was not actually implemented during the one-day
shutdown of MBTA services.
All three case studies demonstrate, although to varying
degrees, that in terms of fostering inter-agency cooperation and response
coordination, the process of contingency planning is just as important
to a response effort as the existence of an actual contingency plan.
The planning processes in the three cases did provide some form of forum
for inter-agency coordination, although the more structured the planning
effort was, the more effective the coordinating role of the process
proved to be. In New York and Boston, where specially-created task
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forces developed the transit shutdown contingency plans, many of the
problems associated with a dependence on ad-hoc committees in crisis-
like situations were successfully overcome, at least among those agencies
represented on the task forces. The characteristic of the New York
process that further enhanced the effects of contingency planning on
inter-agency coordination was the fact that the task force there, the
Emergency Control Board, had been established well before the 1980 strike
threat.
A cooperative response effort seems to depend heavily, not
surprisingly, on the involvement of all the agencies to be responsible
for implementing response actions in the planning process itself. In
turn, the willingness of the relevant agencies to actually become
involved in the planning process prior to a transit service disruption
is affected by at least three characteristics of the pre-disruption
environment: (1) the certainty with which the disruption is expected to
occur and the potential impact of the disruption on each agency's
routine; (2) the presence of an agency with enough legitimacy and
influence to lead the plan coordination process; and (3) the nature of
the political atmosphere surrounding the potential disruption, including
the relative positions on the issue of the lead agency and the other
agencies to be involved in the response.
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3. The Relationship Between Response Planning and Implementation
Any coordination or cooperation among agencies fostered
during the contingency planning process certainly contributes to what
will ultimately be an effective response effort, but simple cooperation
alone cannot ensure that the actions developed for the response plan
will actually be implemented correctly, or implemented at all, when a
disruption occurs. Among the agencies involved in planning, or even
within individual agencies, those preparing the plans rarely have the
opportunity or capacity to implement the plan components directly. Past
studies of contingency planning efforts have emphasized the importance
of effective implementation techniques to a response effort,[2] and have
suggested that involvement of implementing units is one way of promoting
agency commitments to the implementation of the plan.[3]
The third proposition made in the first chapter of this
thesis postulates that such involvement of implementing agencies can in
fact help promote the acceptance and subsequent implementation of the
selected transportation contingency actions. Involvement of as many
responding agencies as possible in the contingency planning process not
only increases the likelihood of successful implementation of response
actions, it can also lead to a widened perspective of the total crisis
for the individual groups involved.[4] Acceptance of the proposed
response actions is the key: "a low-quality solution that has good
acceptance can be more effective than a higher quality solution that
lacks acceptance". [5]
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The implementation experiences in the three cases studied
appear to solidly support the notion that participation by implementing
agencies in the planning process does enhance the implementation process.
Under New York City's emergency management framework, implementing and
enforcement agencies were actively involved in the pre-strike prepara-
tions, and were fully aware of their responsibilities once the strike
began. In Philadelphia, on the other hand, although the Police Depart-
ment had been nominally "involved" in the planning process led by the
Office of the Managing Director, the parking ticket "fiasco" on the
first day of the Philadelphia strike suggests that this involvement was
minimal. Poor communications and a misunderstanding between City Hall
and the Police Department created a situation in which one policy was
announced, while another was actually implemented. Whether due to poor
communications, misunderstandings, or inadequate involvement in the
planning process of the implementing agency, such contradictions do
little to generate public support for the transportation measures in a
contingency plan.
In addition to simply ensuring that implementing agencies
participate in the planning process, there are several factors which
must be present in plan preparation for the selected measures to be
successfully implemented during a transit service stoppage. The
Philadelphia experience demonstrates how important clear communication
between the contingency planners and the implementors, together with an
understanding of the measures on the part of the implementors, are to
the response effort. The confusion experienced during the Philadelphia
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strike suggests that when contingency actions are formulated, the
actions and the associated implementation responsibilities should be
explicitly detailed, and care must be taken to ensure that the implemen-
ting bodies understand their responsibilities.
An obvious, yet apparently elusive, objective of making the
link between response planning and implementation involves the alloca-
tion of implementation tasks among the agencies involved. The contin-
gency measures selected for an agency should be within the capabilities
of that agency. When a contingency measure is proposed, the ability of
an agency to implement that measure, the extent to which it would have
to alter its routine to implement it, and the actual costs to the agency
of implementing it are important considerations that can affect the
ultimate success of a response effort.
The participation of the Boston.Police Department in the
contingency planning process prior to the MBTA service disruption is one
of the better examples of how the link between planning and implementa-
tion can be made. In the Boston case, the Police Department was not only
directly involved in plan preparation, but it in fact suggested the
actions which it felt it could effectively implement. Once a preliminary
contingency plan had been formulated by the Task Force, the Police
Department, as a primary implementing agency, virtually took over the
response preparation process. In this case, then, the contingency
actions were proposed by the Task Force based on data originally
supplied by the Police Department, and then the Police Department itself
became responsible for the logistics of plan implementation. Although
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the plan was not implemented in the Boston case, the degree of involve-
ment of the implementing bodies in the planning process, and their ap-
parent acceptance of the plan produced, would suggest that the trans-
portation actions could have been implemented successfully in a shutdown
situation.
The proposition that involvement of implementing bodies in
the planning stages can be a foundation for making a link between
contingency planning and implementation therefore seems to be supported
by the actual experiences examined. These experiences, however, also
indicate that in some cases, simply including implementors in the
planning process may not be enough. The lesson to be learned from all
three cases studied is that, once an implementing agency does become
involved in contingency planning, efforts must be made to match the
proposed contingency transportation measures with the capabilities,
resources, and even the interests of the implementing agencies. In
addition, throughout the planning process, involvement of the implemen-
ting bodies has to be supplemented by continual, direct, and clear
communication with those formulating the actual contingency measures.
In the cases examined, the nature of the actual process of
contingency planning which occurred before each disruption had a
substantial influence on the contingency plan developed and on the
effectiveness of each response effort once the disruption began. The
first three propositions made on the basis of the literature reviewed in
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Chapter One appear to hold true, given the contingency planning
experiences studied. The actual experiences in Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia, however, further suggest a number of conclusions about the
process of response planning not mentioned in previous studies, conclu-
sions that will be useful in the development of a generalized response
planning framework in Chapter Seven.
While there are many other considerations, the most important
characteristic of an effective contingency planning process, for the
functioning of individual agencies, for inter-agency coordination, and
for linking the planning efforts to eventual response implementation, is
involvement. Involvement of as many responding agencies as possible in
the contingency planning process, while not guaranteeing success on its
own, emerges as the key to all three aspects of response plan prepara-
tion discussed thus far. That is, agency involvement in plan preparation
can serve to improve:
(1) the ability of the agency to prepare its own
operations for a disruption;
(2) the level of inter-agency coordination and co-
operation developed in the contingency planning
process; and
(3) the likelihood of the selected contingency
measures actually being implemented as planned.
The contingency planning process that is established is thus
a very important output of any response planning effort. The other out-
put, the contingency plan itself, is obviously just as important to the
success of a response effort, and is examined in detail in the following
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chapter. The planning experiences of the three case studies are once
again used to discuss the most desirable characteristics of a contingency
plan and the types of measure that can be included.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FORMULATING AND IMPLEMENTING CONTINGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS
The experiences during the three transit system shutdowns, in
terms of the process of contingency planning adopted, tend to support
the conclusions of past research on crisis planning that the planning
process can be as important to an effective response as the contingency
plan itself. The contingency planning efforts described above demon-
strate how the issues of organizational decision-making, inter-agency
coordination, and the relationship between the planning and implementa-
tion of response measures can be crucial to the outcome of an organized
response to a transit stoppage. Yet, even when inter-agency cooperation
and coordination exist in the planning process adopted, significant
effort still has to be devoted to the development of specific response
measures, the creation of an actual plan, and, if necessary, the
implementation of the measures selected for use in a disruption.
This chapter examines the outputs of the planning processes
or "crisis management frameworks" discussed in Chapter Three, namely,
contingency plans and the measures they contain. The overall goals of
formulating response plans for transit service disruptions are outlined
first, and compared among the three cases. Given the types of objec-
tives to be achieved through contingency planning, some of the specific
transportation measures used in the case studies are described and
compared next. The general characteristics of contingency plans in
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terms of their format, level of detail, and structure are then discussed,
and related both to past research and the proposition about plan format
initially made in Chapter One. Finally, a number of issues to be dealt
with in implementing and monitoring such transportation measures are
examined.
1. Objectives of a Transit Stoppage Response Plan
As suggested in Chapter One, the general goals of contingency
planning in advance of a transit service interruption can include the
maintenance of public safety, the retention of certain levels of acces-
sibility to specific areas or mobility for certain groups, and, in
general, the avoidance of the type of travel chaos and congestion that
can arise in the absence of public transit service. In order to achieve
these rather broad goals, however, the transportation-related measures
to be included in the contingency plan must be geared toward the attain-
ment of more specific objectives.
The particular measures to be selected depend to a large
extent on the nature of the specific disruption under consideration, on
the capacity and structure of the transportation network in the given
city, on the extent to which alternative or supplemental transportation
services will be available during a transit service disruption, and even
on the physical characteristics of the metropolitan area (e.g. water
barriers, access routes). The objectives that contingency planners
tried to meet in planning for the three disruptions studied are
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discussed separately below. On a comparative basis, the influence of
the characteristics of each city on the objectives established will
quickly become apparent. In addition, other considerations such as the
political environment and existing inter-agency relationships proved to
have a substantial impact on plan objectives.
In the New York City case, officials were well aware of the
fact that the biggest threat to the city during a transit strike would
be unmanageable vehicle congestion in the Manhattan core area. An
intense concentration of commercial activities and the heaviest depen-
dence on public transit for CBD access of any city in the United States,
when combined with the fact that Manhattan is an island with a limited
number of vehicle access routes, made congestion on downtown streets and
on the bridges and tunnels feeding them a primary concern for planners.
Congestion of these facilities would carry with it several major
repercussions for the functioning of the urban area. First and most
obvious of the impacts would be significant delays for commuters
attempting to gain access to or move around in Manhattan. Such delays
would serve to discourage travel, thereby resulting in monetary losses
to retailers and employers located in the downtown area, and would in
general aggravate anyone attempting to move about.
The less direct repercussions of intense vehicle congestion
in and around the core could be much more serious. Public safety could
become endangered if emergency vehicles were unable to move because of
congested streets. And, if the accumulation of vehicles on the street
network in Manhattan were to reach a level of saturation, "grid lock"
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could be the result. Grid lock occurs when an entire sector of a street
system, intersections included, becomes saturated with vehicles to the.
point that no vehicle is able to move. When it does occur, the only
remedy is to have police direct traffic manually, starting at the outer
edge of the affected sector, and working inward.
New York's Transit Strike Contingency Plan was designed to
avoid such conditions, and to keep traffic moving in order to maintain
some level of mobility in the core area. Specifically, the objectives
of the measures proposed in the plan included:[1]
(1) the maintenance of emergency services;
(2) providing exclusive routes for the remaining mass
transportation services;
(3) maximizing the efficiency of arterial roadways
and access routes; and
(4) keeping the accumulation of vehicles in Manhattan
to a manageable level.
The New York plan thus focussed on preventing the adverse conditions
which could arise, rather than specifically helping individuals or
businesses to cope with a lack of public transportation. The implemen-
tation of specific measures to attain the above objectives did, never-
theless, help individual commuters cope, as will be discussed in the
next section of this chapter.
The Emergency Management Framework in place in New York before
the disruption, and the presence of a supportive political atmosphere,
might suggest that planners could have made the maintenance of indivi-
duals' mobility a more explicit objective in developing the contingency
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measures. The magnitude and implications of the problems associated
with severe congestion in Manhattan, however, make such an expectation
somewhat unrealistic. The limited resources available to planners,
particularly in the form of implementation and enforcement personnel,
necessitated a primary focus on the prevention of unmanageable conges-
tion in the New York case.
In the Boston situation, many of the objectives of the planned
measures were similar to those established in New York, in part because
the Boston Task Force closely examined the New York transit strike
experience when formulating its own plan. Several characteristics of
the Boston situation made the contingency plan objectives and measures
used in New York appropriate for an MBTA shutdown. The old and narrow
streets in Boston's central business district, together with the fact
that the core area is surrounded on three sides by water, made downtown
congestion the biggest threat to Boston's functioning during a shutdown
as well. In fact, the existing volume of traffic on Boston's antiquated
downtown street network made controlling the number of vehicles in the
core area the primary objective of a response plan.
It was the Boston Police Department, as outlined in the Boston
case summary in Chapter Two, which set a ten percent increase in peak
hour downtown traffic volumes as the maximum that could be handled by
the street network and traffic officers without creating crippling
congestion levels. The contingency planning Task Force then based their
data analysis, limited as it was, and the actual response measures it
proposed on this ten percent estimate. The primary objective for the
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contingency plan in Boston was thus the result of input from what would
be the primary implementing agency in the event of an MBTA shutdown.
The remaining objectives to be met by Boston's Transit
Shutdown Contingency Plan can be traced to specific problems likely to
be encountered in the Boston situation. Bridges and tunnels leading
into the core area were a major concern to Boston planners, as they
created a great potential for serious bottlenecks. Unfortunately, the
fact that most of the access facilities were controlled by other juris-
dictions, mostly State agencies under the Governor's control, precluded
the establishment of objectives or measures that involved controlling
access to, or improving flows on, these routes.
Objectives involving the facilitation of travel to and from
employment locations in the core area were more prominent in the Boston
planning process than in New York because of the involvement of the
business community and downtown retailers in Boston. The Transit Emer-
gency Task Force was composed of private sector representatives, and it
was the Chamber of Commerce that first became aware of the potential
need for a contingency plan when a consumer group originally proposed a
business-oriented contingency plan. In general, then, the Boston
contingency plan contained measures to meet three categories of objec-
tives:
(1) controlling automobile traffic in the downtown
area;
(2) promoting the use of alternative transportation
services; and
(3) garnering support of the downtown business
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community to facilitate employee access to employ-
ment locations.
Once again, the explicit objectives for which transportation
measures were to be developed did not specifically address the mobility
problems of individuals, particularly those with no access to another
mode of urban travel. Many individuals would admittedly benefit from
measures that met the above objectives, but a lack of time and resources
in the planning process ruled out more extensive efforts to provide
alternative transportation to transit dependents in the inner city. As
mentioned in the Boston case summary, the establishment of such an
alternative transportation operation would be legally and financially
complicated enough under routine conditions, let alone under the threat
of a transit system shutdown.
Finally, one objective of the Boston response plan that was
not at all evident in the New York case involved its use as a political
weapon in the evolving debate over MBTA funding arrangements. As will
be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, Boston City officials realized
that the mere existence of a transit shutdown response plan, and the
types of transportation measures it contained, could affect the eventual
outcome of the MBTA funding debate. In addition, the way in which the
plan would ultimately be put to use could have significant impacts on
the political fortunes of the Mayor and other involved officials.
The Boston and New York cases demonstrate how the objectives
of two different contingency planning efforts can be alike, in that
similar problems of congestion and public safety were addressed, while
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at the same time different objectives can arise due to the involvement
of different groups in the planning process, because of greater time and
resource limitations, and because of the politics surrounding the tran-
sit crisis. The objectives set for the Philadelphia contingency plan
further reinforce both the similarities and differences mentioned, in
spite of the fact that Philadelphia's response plan objectives were not
made as clear in the planning process.
Controlling the potential for severe congestion in downtown
Philadelphia was naturally among the most important objectives in
developing the response plan. City officials felt that measures to keep
intersections clear and to make every possible downtown location avail-
able for vehicle parking would suffice in handling the increased traffic
volumes. Keeping cars out of the core area was not made an explicit
objective for the measures to be applicable to the general public,
although measures designed to meet this objective were developed for
City employees working in the downtown area.
The absence of additional explicit objectives for the
Philadelphia contingency plan is attributable in large part to the
approach to contingency planning taken by the agencies involved. As
outlined in the Philadelphia case summary, the Office of the Managing
Director felt that the public's past experiences with transit shutdowns
would enable commuters to cope. This meant that the primary objectives
from the City's point of view were:
(1) controlling congestion in the core; and
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(2) setting an example for other large employers with
respect to the actions to be taken to ensure
normal employee attendance.
Similarly, the experience of Police officials with past transit strikes
in Philadelphia suggested that the objectives of any contingency actions
under their control should be:
(1) the maintenance of an orderly traffic flow; and
(2) public safety.
A number of objectives evident in the New York and Boston
plans did not emerge in the Philadelphia situation. Along with a depen-
dence on past experience with transit strikes, the characteristics of
the Philadelphia urban area itself made the attainment of certain
objectives unnecessary. For example, more access routes to the core
area and wider arterial roads reduced the need for measures designed to
improve access facility efficiency. Similarly, the availability of
several alternative transportation services made the provision of ad-
ditional services unnecessary, except in the case of inner city transit
dependents. Like the New York and Boston plans, the Philadelphia
response effort did not include mobility maintenance objectives for
isolated groups.
In all three cases examined, the focus of the plan objectives
appeared to be on the home-to-work trips of those residing in suburban
locations and working in core areas. Limited time and/or resources for
planning an extensive program of alternative transportation in inner
city areas meant that the needs of transit dependents during the transit
service interruptions were all but ignored. The unfortunate truth is
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that, given time and personnel constraints for contingency planning,
resources can be more efficiently spent on developing objectives and
measures that prevent chaotic conditions during a disruption instead of
measures that promote normal travel conditions for everyone in the
metropolitan area.
In general, then, there are numerous objectives which can be
set for a contingency response plan and the measures it contains.
Ranging from the fairly vague "ensuring public safety" to the more
specific "keeping traffic volumes in the core area below 110 percent of
current levels", the objectives set for a contingency plan can and will
vary from one situation to the next. Public safety and uncontrolled
congestion will be major concerns in any major metropolitan area facing
a transit system shutdown. The more specific objectives set, and the
actual measures developed to meet these objectives, will be affected by
the individuals or groups responsible for the plan and the planning
approach taken, by the physical characteristics of the urban area and
its transportation network, and by the nature of the disruption and the
politics behind it.
2. Transportation and Related Response Measures
Given the wide range of influences on the objectives of a
transit stoppage contingency plan, it becomes difficult to prescribe one
set of transportation-related contingency measures as being the most
appropriate for all transit system shutdowns. Each objective set for
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the response plan can be met by numerous specific measures and, con-
versely, most of the measures selected will likely serve to satisfy more
than one objective.
The discussion of contingency measures in this section
therefore focuses on four major categories of transportation-related
response actions used in the case study situations. Measures to
increase vehicle occupancy levels, to improve traffic flows on existing
roadways, to encourage the use of alternative transportation services,
and employer-based actions are discussed separately. Under each
category, the specific measures included in the three planning efforts
studies are described and, where possible, the impacts of the measures
on travel patterns during the disruptions are compared.
A. Increasing Vehicle Occupancy Levels
As mentioned in the preceding section, traffic congestion in
the downtown core of the metropolitan area is certain to be a major
concern during any transit service disruption. One method of control-
ling vehicle congestion on a street network with a given capacity is to
make the same number of vehicles carry more passengers. Measures to
achieve this end can range from simply encouraging commuters to form
carpools, to specific incentives for car drivers to carry more passen-
gers, to outright restrictions on access to core areas for vehicles
carrying less than some specified number of occupants.
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At the more drastic end of this range of measures are vehicle
occupancy restrictions imposed on vehicles entering the downtown core.
The appropriateness of such restrictions depends both on the severity of
the congestion anticipated by the contingency planners and on the
physical characteristics of the street network in and around the core
area. Existing heavy CBD congestion, narrow downtown streets operating
above capacity levels, inadequate parking facilities for existing or
anticipated vehicle volumes, and a potential for "grid-lock" conditions
to develop are factors which may point to a need for vehicle occupancy
restrictions during a transit service disruption. Another, just as
important, consideration is the degree to which such a restriction
could be effectively enforced. Apart from constraints in the form of
personnel or finances available for enforcement, the actual configura-
tion of access routes into the core area plays a big role in determining
the feasibility of access restrictions.
In New York and Boston, the two cases in which vehicle
occupancy restrictions were proposed and/or implemented, the limited
number of access routes to the downtown across waterways made enforce-
ment at least a viable threat to drivers ignoring the restrictions. In
fact, in Manhattan, police and enforcement officers were able to turn
back cars containing less than three persons at the bridge and tunnel
exits, and at a boundary established north of the Manhattan core (see
Exhibit 4-1). The restrictions in Boston, if implemented, would have
similarly involved bridge and tunnel access points to the central city
and a somewhat longer perimeter around the parts of the downtown area
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EXHIBIT 4-1: ZONE OF VEHICLE OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS
DURING NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT STRIKE, 1980
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bordered by land (Exhibit 4-2).
If vehicle occupancy restrictions are indeed judged by con-
tingency planners to be an appropriate preventative measure to control
severe congestion, decisions have to be made with respect to the
geographic extent, the temporal duration, and the exact limit on persons
per vehicle of the restrictions. With unlimited time, resources, and
data availability, these decisions could ideally be made on the basis of
detailed technical analyses of travel patterns and forecasts of antici-
pated vehicle and person flows into the core area. Experience, however,
suggests that such ideal conditions are unlikely to occur, meaning these
decisions will depend to a great extent on past experience, simple data
analysis, and input from the enforcing agencies.
Vehicle occupancy restrictions thus formed the backbone of
two of the response efforts studied. They are appropriate only under
certain conditions, and because their implementation tends to be contro-
versial, their use should be accompanied by both a commitment on the part
of City officials to ensure enforcement and some level of cooperation on
the part of the public. Such measures are controversial because there
is some debate over their legality, as some would argue that vehicle
occupancy restrictions interfere with certain civil liberties.
One final consideration affecting the feasibility of using
occupancy restrictions involves the impacts of their implementation on
adjacent areas. In Boston, for example, surrounding jurisdictions were
concerned that the back-ups caused by any occupancy restrictions would
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EXHIBIT 4-2: ZONE OF VEHICLE OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS PROPOSED FOR
BOSTON'S MBTA SHUTDOWN, 1980
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shift the congestion problem from downtown Boston to the neighbourhoods
outside the cordon area. Again, the feasibility of enforcement and co-
operation of other actors become key issues. The point is that, if
vehicle occupancy restrictions are to be made a primary measure in a
contingency plan, all of the above considerations are important in
ensuring that the measure achieves its objective of controlling conges-
tion rather than simply threatening to do so or shifting the problem to
another location.
There are several less stringent measures available for
increasing vehicle occupancy levels in congested central areas during
transit stoppages. One step down from absolute restrictions are
incentives designed to encourage increased vehicle occupancy levels.
Preferential treatment for high occupancy vehicles (HOV's) on major
access routes, at toll collection facilities, or even at downtown
parking locations are all possible incentives.
In.situations where occupancy restrictions for the entire
downtown area are not appropriate or feasible, such restrictions on
selected access routes or central area arterial roads may be a viable
alternative. Although not directed toward private automobiles, the
restriction of access to certain Manhattan avenues to taxis, remaining
bus operations, and delivery vehicles during the 1980 strike provides an
example of the priority roadway concept. Also considered, but not
implemented, in New York was the designation of selected bridges and
tunnels entering Manhattan as high occupancy vehicle access routes.
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Designating separate lanes on major access routes for vehicles with at
least a certain number of passengers is another possibility, although
such a measure would require more effort to be put into signing and
advance publicity, and would be more difficult to enforce than entirely
exclusive roadways. Past experiences with exclusive HOV lanes on
expressways, implemented during routine conditions,[2] suggest that use
of HOV lanes introduced especially for a transit service disruption is
likely to be less than effective.
Pricing incentives to encourage car pooling are also pos-
sible, particularly in terms of downtown parking charges. Either a
discount for car poolers or a parking surcharge for automobiles carrying
less than some number of occupants can encourage commuters to share
rides to and from the downtown area. Along the same line, measures to
make the most accessible parking areas available exclusively to carpool
vehicles, or the provision of separate lanes at toll collection facili-
ties for HOV's can be effectively used.
Establishing carpool staging areas at suburban locations
(i.e. parking areas where commuters can leave their cars and form car-
pools) is a measure that can supplement any incentive measures imposed.
Provisions for such staging areas were included in all three contingency
plans examined. In Philadelphia, the remote carpool staging areas were
the only City-initiated measures implemented to increase vehicle
occupancy levels during the transit strike, although employers were
encouraged to establish their own ride-sharing programs. In New York,
many of the staging areas went largely unused, possibly because of
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public perceptions of inadequate security measures on the lots.[3]
The implementation of carpool staging areas on a temporary
basis during a transit stoppage is perhaps the least complex of all the
vehicle occupancy measures described. Still, contingency planners must
give some attention to the location of such areas, the responsibility
for providing security at the lots (especially if the lot is to be
located in another jurisdiction, as it often will be), and the need for
public information if the staging areas are to be effective.
Overall, then, each of the response efforts studied contained
at least some measures designed to prescribe or encourage higher levels
of occupancy for vehicles entering the central city and using major
access routes. In the two situations in which measures were actually
implemented, car occupancy levels did in fact increase during the
transit service disruption. It is impossible, of course, to determine
the extent to which the specific measures contributed to the increased
occupancy levels, as some of the increase can be attributed to voluntary
actions on the part of commuters reacting to increased congestion of
inadequate parking in the core area.
In New York, the mandatory restriction on auto occupancy in
the downtown area was the biggest factor contributing to an increase in
car occupancy levels from 1.5 commuters per car to 3.2 commuters per car
during the transit strike.[4] On the other hand, the availability of
remote carpool staging areas in Philadelphia had an undetermined impact.
Car occupancy levels did increase during the Philadelphia strike, but
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not nearly as much as they did in New York.[5]
It is clear that many of the above measures to increase
vehicle occupancy levels and thereby make more efficient use of the
existing road network make a great deal of sense under routine condi-
tions as well as during transit service disruptions. In formulating
such measures for a contingency plan, those involved in the planning
process might want to develop a high occupancy vehicle program that can
be left essentially intact after the disruption ends. This possibility
is more fully discussed in the next chapter. At this point, it is only
worth noting that too many or overly complex new measures implemented
for a transit service disruption can create added confusion for motorists
already frustrated by increased congestion, and thereby preclude the
retention of the measures in the aftermath of the disruption.
B. Improving Traffic Flows on Existing Roadways
Closely related to actions designed to increase vehicle
occupancy are measures geared toward making the most efficient use of
existing roadways during a transit stoppage. Both types of measure at-
tempt to increase the capacity of street and highway networks. The
difference lies in the fact that, while occupancy measures increase the
number of persons carried by a given number of vehicles, measures to
improve roadway efficiency increase the number of vehicles carried on a
given road network. As was the case with vehicle occupancy measures,
traffic flow measures can vary considerably in their complexity and the
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amount of effort required to implement them.
The more involved schemes to improve traffic flow can include
the reversal of traffic flow on major access routes and arterial roads
during peak periods. In Boston, a network of one-way streets was to be
implemented in the downtown area to handle increased traffic volumes
during the morning and evening rush hours. Not quite as elaborate was
New York's use of lane reversals on major access routes (i.e. bridges
and tunnels).
Complementary to any lane/road reversal or one-way street
plan are measures designed to control parked vehicles and other obstruc-
tions on the streets involved, thereby further increasing road capacity
and improving traffic flows. In both New York and Boston, stricter
police enforcement of parking regulations was one measure included in
the respective contingency plan. In New York, changes to existing
parking regulations were also under this category of transportation
measures. There, "no standing" regulations were imposed on major
arterial roads to reduce the number and duration of obstructions to
traffic flow.
Similarly, parking privileges on alternate sides of some
streets were suspended for the duration of the transit strike. Obstruc-
tions to traffic flow were also reduced in New York by increased tow
truck operations (for stranded or illegally parked vehicles) and a
suspension of any road repair operations that would disrupt traffic
flows. Finally, a special effort to prevent "grid lock" in Manhattan
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through stricter enforcement of intersection obstruction violations
completed the list of traffic flow improvement measures implemented in
New York.
Boston's one-way peak flow traffic plan was to be supple-
mented both by stricter parking enforcement efforts and restrictions on
deliveries in the downtown area. Deliveries were to be made before
11 a.m. or after 6 p.m. to keep downtown streets clear for the midday
and afternoon peak periods.
In Philadelphia, the contingency plan included provision for
relaxed parking regulations downtown rather than stricter enforcement of
the existing regulations. This approach was intended to make more
parking spaces available in the downtown core along the wider streets.
Relaxed parking regulations were announced by City officials, in spite
of the fact that police officials would have wanted to see tightened
regulation of downtown parking, as discussed in the Philadelphia case
summary. The Philadelphia response effort did, however, include some
actions to improve traffic flows on downtown streets. Traffic police
were assigned to all major intersections to keep them clear during peak
periods to prevent any occurrence of "grid lock".
Improving vehicle flow on major roadways was thus an integral
part of the contingency planning efforts examined. In terms of mitiga-
ting the impacts of a transit service stoppage on travel times and
patterns, the measures described above go hand-in-hand with measures to
increase vehicle occupancy levels - both serve to increase the capacity
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of the remaining transportation network. Ensuring efficient traffic
flow is also crucial to public safety considerations during a transit
service disruption. Designating major streets as priority roadways
where intense efforts are to be made to keep traffic moving is essential
in providing emergency vehicle access to fires, accidents, and hospitals.
New York's contingency plan provided for a number of exclusive lanes and
roadways for emergency vehicles, while Boston's one-way street scheme
was at least partially a result of concerns about emergency vehicle
access.
Evaluating the effectiveness of traffic flow measures on
travel times or travel patterns is even more difficult than assessing
the impact of vehicle occupancy measures on person-per-vehicle figures
during a transit service disruption. It is virtually impossible to
determine the improvement in travel times caused by a lane reversal on a
bridge, for example, unless before and after data is collected on dif-
ferent days during the transit disruption. It is intuitively clear,
however, that three lanes of traffic in one direction on a bridge can
carry more traffic than two lanes, thereby reducing overall travel
times. Similarly, efforts to increase street capacities by controlling
the amount of on-street parking and reducing the number and duration of
traffic obstructions can produce visible results in terms of traffic
flows.
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C. Promoting Alternative Transportation Modes and Services
The most important factor in determining the feasibility of
contingency measures designed to promote the use of alternative trans-
portation modes and services during a transit service stoppage is, not
surprisingly, the availability of such alternatives in a given metro-
politan area. Commuters in all major cities will be able to make use of
taxis, carpools, bicycles, and their own feet. Some metropolitan areas
may have an inherent advantage in this area, however, as there may
already exist an extensive system of mass transportation services which
will not be affected by a shutdown of the main public transit operation
(e.g. commuter rail services, suburban bus lines). Contingency measures
under this category can therefore include measures to facilitate use of
alternative private modes, measures to publicize the existence of
alternative public transportation services, and even more direct actions
to actually provide substitute transportation services during the
transit service disruption.
All of the response planning efforts contained measures to
encourage commuters to find alternative transportation on their own, or
with the help of their employers. Ride-sharing was encouraged in all
the cases through the use of occupancy restrictions or preferential
treatment for HOV's, as described above. In New York and Boston,
bicycling and walking provisions were explicitly considered in the
response plans. New York's plan in fact provided for separate bicycle
lanes on some downtown streets, and the lanes were retained for use
after the transit strike ended. Apart from physical improvements to
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facilitate bicycling, other measures could include the provision of
bicycle parking areas in the downtown, and encouragement of employers
to make shower and change facilities available to employees who bicycle
to work.
Taxicabs were another private (or "semi-private") transporta-
tion mode addressed in the Boston and New York plans. Both plans
contained measures to alter the existing taxi operating regulations to
permit group riding in taxicabs. The measures were, again, directed
toward increasing the passenger capacity of an existing transportation
service. Boston planners also proposed the concept of taxi jitney
services to operate along major transit corridors. Taxis would have
been allowed to operate along transit routes, picking up passengers and
charging a fixed or zone-based fare. There were concerns, however, that
legal constraints could preclude the establishment of such a service,
and that securing the cooperation of the taxi licensing bodies in all
the involved jurisdictions surrounding the city of Boston could prove to
be difficult.
The availability of alternative modes of public mass trans-
portation varied among the cases examined, and was to at least some
extent influenced by the transit service disruption involved in each
situation. The start of the New York transit workers' strike was
accompanied by a strike at the Long Island commuter railroad system.
For the first two days of the NYCTA strike, commuters were unable to
make use of LIRR commuter trains. Once the railroad workers returned to
their jobs, however, the commuter rail system proved to be valuable to
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many daily commuters. The New York Transit Strike Contingency Plan
itself did not focus explicitly on promoting the use of alternative
public transportation services.
There was some uncertainty among Boston officials with res-
pect to the exact status of the MBTA commuter rail operations in the
event that the MBTA system would be forced to shut down because of
inadequate operating funds. Because funding for commuter rail was
generally separate from transit funding, and because commuter rail
services were provided under contract by a railroad company, planners
believed that commuter rail operations would be able to continue during
a system shutdown. The existing levels of crowding and limited capaci-
ties of commuter rail systems in these and most other cases, however,
will constrain the effectiveness of commuter rail in providing alter-
native transportation to any significant proportion of those stranded by
a service shutdown.
The availability of alternative mass transportation services
was substantially higher in Philadelphia, where Conrail commuter train
operations combined with suburban bus lines, New Jersey Transit suburban
buses, and a high-speed rail line operated by an agency separate from
SEPTA to provide a fairly extensive network of supplementary public
transportation. The Philadelphia contingency plan did not explicitly
promote the use of these services, but the Chamber of Commerce did
publicize them in their efforts to inform the public and major employers
of the impending strike.
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If the Philadelphia experience is any indication, the exis-
tence of such supplemental mass transportation services in a metropoli-
tan area can serve to reduce the extent or number of transportation
measures required in a contingency response plan. Efforts can be made
to publicize the remaining services and, if possible, to arrange for
additional capacity on these services. Where such supplemental services
do not exist or are fairly limited, the contingency plan can also
include measures to provide additional public transportation services as
a substitute for the normal public transit operation. The Boston and
New York plans once again provide the best examples of such measures.
The Boston plan proposed to initiate a ferry service across
the harbor to link the downtown area to the North Shore/Airport area
during the MBTA shutdown. As well, private bus operators would be
allowed to expand their services in Boston for the duration of a shut-
down. Similarly, ferry services in New York were expanded during the
transit strike there. Considerations of licensing, jurisdictional
authority, and even public opinion can serve, however, to hinder the
establishment of substitute transportation services during a transit
service stoppage. For example, although Boston planners were willing to
let private bus operators expand service on their existing routes, they
stopped short of allowing private buses to operate on MBTA bus routes,
as discussed in the Boston case summary. Legal implications, the
complexity of the logistics required to establish such service, and a
fear that MBTA unions would disrupt any private operations on MBTA
routes ruled out such an action.
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A similar fear on the part of City officials in Philadelphia,
that of being perceived as encouraging City-sponsored strike-breaking,
meant that substitute services were not even considered. Even with large
numbers of transit dependents unable to travel in the inner city, the
Mayor was not willing to consider directly supplying alternative trans-
portation. In general, then, it would appear that, given the limited
amount of time and resources in any city for planning for a transit
disruption, and given the legal and political turmoil that could arise,
providing substitute transit services during a disruption is not likely
to be a feasible contingency measure in most situations.
The effectiveness of measures designed to encourage the use
of alternative transportation modes and services in a disruption is,
once again, difficult to specify. As mentioned, many of these measures
tend to be interrelated with vehicle occupancy and traffic flow measures
(e.g. promotion of ride-sharing), or are based on the promotion of
already existing supplemental modes and services (e.g. commuter rail).
Observations made in New York City suggest that measures specifically
directed toward bicycling and walking can have a noticeable effect.
Although the good April weather was also a factor, the percentage of
walkers and bicycles entering Manhattan during the strike increased from
1 percent to 10 percent of all entries.[6] The impact of publicizing
the existence of alternative mass transportation, as is the case with
estimating the impact of any marketing campaign, is more difficult to
determine. It is clear, however, that the use of such supplemental
services will undoubtedly increase during transit service interruptions,
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meaning that contingency planners should give at least some considera-
tion to how these services can most effectively be used, the amount of
promotion required, and the extent to which the capacity of these
services can be expanded.
D. Employer-Based Contingency Actions
Most of the transportation measures mentioned thus far are
directed toward making the journey to work, particularly to work loca-
tions in core areas, less frustrating for daily commuters during a
transit service disruption. In fact, the focus of all three contingency
planning efforts studied was on travel to and from downtown employment
centers during the most congested peak periods of the day. There are,
in addition, several contingency actions that can be taken by the
employers themselves, whether under pressure or encouragement from
government contingency planners and officials, or on their own
initiative.
Perhaps the most effective action an employer can take in the
event of a transit service interruption, one that would complement many
of the other government-led measures discussed, is the establishment of
variable or staggered work hours. Staggering the starting and finishing
times for employee work days can help reduce the peaking of demand on
transportation facilities even under routine conditions, and would thus
be especially effective in the absence of transit service. All three
response planning efforts provided for staggered work hours for
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employees, but the extent of effort put into promoting the measure dif-
fered substantially among the cities studied.
In New York, the Mayor requested that major employers
implement either staggered work hours or a four-day work week to reduce
the daily flow of commuters into Manhattan. This request, unfortunately,
was not made until the strike began and, as mentioned in the New York
case summary, most businesses were either totally reluctant or unable to
implement the measures during the 11-day strike.
The involvement of business interests in the contingency
planning process in Boston, on the other hand, ensured that most major
employers would be at least aware of the need for staggered work hours.
The contingency plan proposed in Boston provided for the encouragement
of staggered work hours by the City. A mandatory staggered work hour
scheme had been imposed in Boston in the aftermath of a 1978 blizzard,
but such a course of action could have proven to be unwise from the
point of view of the Mayor's Office in the MBTA shutdown situation
because of the politics and inter-governmental battles involved in the
funding debate.
Philadelphia's contingency plan only explicitly provided for
staggered hours for City employees. It was hoped that, by setting the
example for other large employers, the City could encourage widespread
establishment of staggered work hours during the transit strike. It was
actually the Chamber of Commerce that provided the biggest incentive to
large employers to stagger work hours by distributing information
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packages about what actions could be taken during a strike. The Chamber
of Commerce in Philadelphia was also instrumental in encouraging major
employers to establish their own ride-sharing programs, with the same
information packages outlining the steps in matching riders to carpools.
Ride-sharing was thus one way in which employers in Philadelphia could
facilitate employee travel to and from work during a strike, even though
vehicle occupancy or preferential treatment measures to encourage ride-
sharing had not been included for the general public in the City-
prepared response plan.
New York's vehicle occupancy restrictions virtually ensured
that employees headed for the downtown area would carpool to work.
Still, large employers were encouraged by the Mayor to coordinate ride-
sharing arrangements within their companies. Boston's vehicle occupancy
restrictions would have had a similar effect, but they too would have
been supplemented by employer plans to undertake some form of carpool
matching.
The experiences with contingency planning for a transit
system disruption in all three cities demonstrated that the largest
employers were prepared to take action to get their employees to work in
the absence of public transit service, with or without the help of a
City-prepared plan. Philadelphia provides the best example of this,
where the largest employers were literally left with little choice but
to take action on their own. Even in Boston and New York, where more
structured contingency plans were produced, large employers still
prepared their own, separate actions. In Boston, the major downtown
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employers and retailers considered the establishment of a shuttle bus
system to feed the downtown in the event of an MBTA shutdown. And in
New York, the large financial institutions did charter buses to bring
employees from ferry terminals and commuter rail stations to the
financial district during the strike.
Given the fact that the foremost concern of all employers
during a transit service stoppage is getting their employees to work,
and given a certain willingness on the part of most employers to take
action, the focus of a government-led response for major employers
should thus be cooperation. Staggered work hours, carpool matching
programs, and privately chartered buses can all be effective contingency
measures for employers to undertake, but their cooperation is necessary
if any coordination of responses is to be achieved. Such cooperation
may not be easy to obtain, however, for two reasons. First, most
retailers and employers would much prefer no service stoppage, and may
regard a contingency planning effort as a reflection of City Hall's
willingness to accept a shutdown. Second, some businesses may prefer to
implement their own measures rather than relying on a City-led response
plan, as was demonstrated in the New York and Boston cases.
In terms of effectiveness, staggered work hours are the only
employer-based contingency actions that can be assessed for their impact
on travel patterns. Experiences in both New York and Philadelphia
support the notion that staggered work hours can help spread and
consequently lower the peak levels of demand during the day. In both
cases, the morning "rush" began noticeably earlier during the transit
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strikes and lasted later. Whether due to employees taking advantage of
earlier and later starting times or simply because of voluntary deci-
sions made by individuals to "beat the rush", it is clear that staggered
or flexible work hours would encourage such travel behavior.
In summary, then, a fairly broad spectrum of alternative
transportation measures, directed toward the attainment of several
different objectives, is available to agencies or officials preparing a
contingency response plan for a transit service interruption. The major
types of measure mentioned in this section are summarized in Exhibit 4-3.
The response planning experiences examined involved many similar types
of transportation measures, but also differed substantially in many ways.
It is clear that time and resource constraints played a role in deter-
mining the types of measures proposed and used in the respective plans,
as all three cities focussed their response efforts on preventing
chaotic travel conditions rather than providing more complicated alter-
native transportation services. This meant that most of the measures
included in the contingency plans were designed to facilitate the
journey to work in downtown locations, primarily benefitting suburban
commuters.
Differences in the measures chosen for implementation can be
traced to factors as diverse as the physical characteristics of the
particular metropolitan area and the political climate surrounding the
transit service disruption at hand. The nature of the contingency
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1. INCREASING VEHICLE OCCUPANCY LEVELS
A. Minimum occupancy restrictions for vehicles entering the core area
B. Preferential treatment for high occupancy vehicles on roadways,
at toll facilities, or at parking locations
C. Vehicle occupancy restrictions on selected access routes or central
area arterials only
D. Pricing incentives for carpools on toll roads or at parking lots
E. Carpool staging areas at suburban locations
2. IMPROVING TRAFFIC FLOWS ON EXISTING ROADS
A. Reversal of traffic flow on major access routes during peak periods
(entire roadway or individual lanes)
B. Designation of a temporary one-way street network in the core area
C. Imposition of parking and standing regulations on major routes
D. Stricter enforcement of parking and stopping restrictions on
downtown and arterial streets
E. Suspension of parking privileges on selected streets
F. Increased tow truck operations for rapid removal of obstructions
G. Suspension of non-essential road repair operations
H. Grid-lock prevention through enforcement of intersection obstruction
violations
I. Physical improvements to ramps and intersections to smooth flows
J. Restriction of deliveries during peak periods
3. PROMOTING ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION MODES AND SERVICES
A. Bicycle routes and separate bicycle lanes on downtown streets
B. Special bicycle parking areas downtown
C. Change taxi regulations to permit taxi group riding
D. Taxi jitney services along major travel corridors
E. Expand capacities of alternative mass transit operations, if
available
F. Initiate passenger ferry service
G. Allow private bus operators to expand services
H. Expand elderly and handicapped transportation services
4. EMPLOYER-BASED ACTIONS
A. Establishment of variable or staggered work hour schemes
B. Four-day work weeks
C. Employer-directed ridesharing programs and carpool matching efforts
D. Shuttle bus services to feed the core area or areas of employment
concentration from commuter rail and ferry terminals
EXHIBIT 4-3: TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED RESPONSE MEASURES AVAILABLE FOR
USE DURING TRANSIT SERVICE STOPPAGES
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planning process adopted, including the approach established for the
process and the agencies and actors directly involved in plan prepara-
tion, formed the basis of many of the differences in the objectives
initially set and, in turn, the measures ultimately included in the
response plan. It was this wide range of actions included in each of
the plans and the wide range of influences on these actions specific to
each context that emphasized the fact that no one list of transportation
contingency measures could possibly be appropriate for all situations.
In terms of preparing a specific response plan, however, the
diverse experiences do provide some general guidelines for future
planning efforts. Already mentioned is the inescapable fact that, in
preparing for most disruptions, time, personnel, and funds will likely
be limited. This means that large-scale, complex schemes to provide
alternative transportation for all groups and programs requiring large
levels of funding or large numbers of personnel for implementation cannot
feasibly be included in most contingency plans. Similarly, the measures
developed for the plan cannot be overly complex or innovative from the
point of view of the commuter. Transportation programs that take months
to implement under routine conditions should, obviously, not be con-
sidered for instant implementation under crisis-like conditions.
Perhaps the most important guideline for the selection of
specific contingency measures to meet given objectives involves the
interrelationships which exist among many of the possible measures.
Encouraging higher vehicle occupancy levels is a prime example. The
imposition of vehicle occupancy restrictions or even preferential
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treatment for HOV's on access routes to the downtown should be supported
by both carpool staging areas in suburban locations and the provision of
adequate parking facilities for the increased number of vehicles to be
entering the central core. What is important here is a recognition of
the fact that the imposition of one transportation measure may have ef-
fects that will require the imposition of complementary measures, while
other measures such as reducing on-street parking may both conflict with
some plan objectives and contribute to others. The selection of speci-
fic measures for inclusion in a contingency plan thus requires the
planners involved to relate the effects of the proposed measures on both
travel patterns during a distribution and on other measures that may be
included in the plan.
3. Format and Structure of Contingency Plans
Having selected specific transportation contingency measures
to satisfy the objectives set for the transit disruption response
effort, those involved in preparing the contingency plan must also be
concerned about the structure and format of the plan itself. A contin-
gency plan can be called "structured", in that it identifies and
describes the measures to be implemented in a disruption, specifies the
agencies responsible for the implementation of each, and explicitly
outlines the resources to be used. A contingency plan can also be
termed "flexible", as it can provide for modification of the measures,
agencies, and resources involved in the response effort as the disruption
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evolves. The fourth proposition made at the end of Chapter One suggests
that an effective contingency plan should strike a balance between
structure and flexibility.
The level of detail and the structure of contingency plans
developed for the three transit service interruptions varied consider-
ably, affected both by the environment in which the response plans were
prepared and by the past experiences of each city with similar disrup-
tions. For example, the response plan prepared in Philadelphia
contained a minimum of actions explicitly directed toward the general
public, relying instead on the past experiences of both the responding
agencies and commuters in dealing with an interruption of transit
service. The City officials responsible for developing a plan took the
view that their role should be one of encouraging private groups to take
their own contingency actions by providing an example of how the City,
as a large employer, could cope with a transit strike.
The response plan developed in Philadelphia was thus rela-
tively unstructured, involving only City departments and the police
department as the primary participants in a response effort. The
document itself took the form of memoranda circulated among the agencies
involved. At the other end of the spectrum of structure and detail is
New York's planning effort for the 1980 transit strike there. The New
York contingency response involved two separate plans, the "Emergency
Management Plan" and the "Transit Strike Contingency Plan".
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The need for a balance between structure and flexibility in
contingency plans suggested by the literature reviewed earlier has given
rise to the concept of a "crisis management framework" developed for use
in any kind of emergency in an urban area. New York's "Emergency
Management Plan" provides the sole example from the three disruptions
studied of this approach to response planning. Under the framework of
the Emergency Management Plan, City officials developed a specific
response plan for the 1980 strike.
The Transit Strike Contingency Plan that was developed was
extremely structured, yet provided flexibility in the response once the
strike occurred. The plan contained an extensive list of transportation
contingency measures, each of which was described in detail, with the
responsibility for each of actions assigned to the relevant agencies up
to two months before the strike deadline. To ensure overall coordina-
tion and centralized control of the response activities, the transit
strike plan provided for, and specified the responsibilities of, a
"command center". Officials in the command center were made responsible
for ensuring implementation of the planned actions by all the involved
agencies and for monitoring their impacts once implemented.
The flexibility in New York's transit strike plan, ironically,
was provided by the structured manner in which a monitoring system was
to be established. The proposed system for monitoring traffic conges-
tion and contingency measure impacts helped maintain flexibility in the
plan, as changes to any of the response measures could be made when
warranted. As well, the existence of a centralized command and
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communications center meant that adjustments to the response actions
necessitated by changing circumstances could be made rapidly. The
New York Transit Strike Contingency Plan, in effect, provided for
response flexibility through its very structured response framework.
The plan document itself was a comprehensive outline of the proposed
response effort, and was distributed to those involved or simply
interested.
The politicized nature of the impending transit service
interruption in Boston influenced both the environment in which the plan
was developed and, in turn, affected the structural characteristics of
the response plan produced. The result was a response framework between
that of New York and Philadelphia in its level of detail and overall
structure. While the effort put into plan preparation by the Task Force
created a contingency plan much more detailed than the one used in
Philadelphia, the highly-charged political atmosphere and the absence of
any emergency management framework similar to New York's meant that the
implementation structure associated with Boston's plan was much less
sophisticated.
The police department was to be the primary implementing
agency, with City Hall serving as a command center. As previously dis-
cussed, the politics of the Boston crisis meant that little cooperation
could be expected from surrounding localities or the State government.
Still, in terms of the actions to be employed within the city of Boston
in the event of a transit system shutdown, the timing of and responsibi-
lities for the implementation of the proposed measures was well detailed
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in the contingency plan document.
The proposition made in Chapter One concerning structure and
flexibility in contingency plans cannot be fully tested with the limited
results provided by the three experiences examined. Based on past re-
search and the response implementation experience of the most structured
planning effort studied here, it is apparent that both structure and
flexibility play crucial roles in the success of a contingency response
to a transit system shutdown. The two-phase planning process adopted in
New York (i.e. emergency management framework as the basis for a speci-
fic response plan), provided the foundation for an effective planning
and implementation effort by permitting a significant amount of flexi-
bility to occur within the confines of a very structured response plan.
In both of the other cases studied, the establishment of an
emergency management framework like that used in New York would have
been more difficult. In Philadelphia, for example, officials did not
perceive a need for a plan so structured. Because the city had been
able to cope well with previous transit service disruptions, a minimum
of advance planning and coordination was judged to be adequate. In
Boston, political realities ruled out the establishment of a
comprehensive response framework because it would have required substan-
tial cooperation from numerous agencies representing many jurisdictions
within the metropolitan area.
While the circumstances surrounding the particular disruptions
studied in Boston and Philadelphia precluded the establishment of a
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comprehensive emergency management framework, this does not mean that
such a framework could not be established in those cities. Such an
emergency management framework, by establishing inter-agency relation-
ships and an acceptance of contingency planning in advance, can provide
a solid foundation for the formulation of a specific response plan for a
transit system shutdown or strike. The existence of such a structured
framework for the development and implementation of a response plan is
perhaps the most important reason for the success of New York's response
efforts in reducing the adverse impacts of the 1980 transit strike.
4. Implementing and Monitoring Response Actions
The true test of the contingency planning process adopted,
and particularly of the response plan developed, occurs when the antici-
pated transit service disruption actually begins. The outcome of efforts
put into the preparation of individual agencies, the establishment of
inter-agency coordination, linking the planning process to implementa-
tion, and the development of a structured response plan which also
provides flexibility in a disruption is contingent upon actually
implementing and monitoring the proposed response measures. Effective
implementation requires not only an initiation of the response process,
but also a release to the media and public of the details of the response
plan being implemented. Once the planned measures are indeed imple-
mented, the impacts of the transit service disruption and of the con-
tingency measures on travel patterns must be monitored so that the
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response effort can remain flexible as circumstances change.
Even though the plan preparation process may involve the
implementing agencies and the resulting response plan may be adequately
structured, the logistics of implementing the response measures once the
disruption begins should still be explicitly detailed in the plan
itself. Response measure implementation, in principle, should not pose
a great problem after a coordinated plan preparation process, but the
release of the details of the plan to the public is an implementation
issue to be dealt with as the transit service disruption becomes inevi-
table. Because the contingency plan itself can become a political tool
in negotiations surrounding any transit system shutdown, the timing of
the release of the plan can have an influence on the disruption itself.
Concern by the lead agencies over the timing of the plan's
release was evident in both the Boston and Philadelphia cases. Because
the Philadelphia disruption involved contract negotiations between
management and the Transit Workers' Union, the Mayor's Office did not
publicize the plan preparation process at all, and only released details
of the measures to be implemented once the strike actually began. It
was felt that an awareness of the existence of such a plan by the
negotiating parties could have influenced the bargaining process.
Similarly, in Boston, the heated political atmosphere surrounding the
MBTA financial crisis kept the Mayor's Office from releasing the plan
until the system was actually shut down. City officials felt that
public knowledge of the existence of a contingency plan could have com-
promised the City's position on resolving the funding conflict. The
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impact of politics and public opinion on this and other aspects of con-
tingency planning is more fully discussed in Chapter Six.
When political concerns keep the details of a contingency
plan secret until a disruption actually begins, some of the benefits of
advance notice of the disruption can be lost. Nevertheless, as long as
all the implementing agencies and organizations willing to respond are
fully aware of their implementation responsibilities, an effective
response is possible. Because specific measures cannot be made public
in advance of many transit service disruptions, the contingency planning
process should consider plan publicity and the role to be taken by the
media in a disruption. An information package should be developed as
part of the response plan so that the media can be given an accurate,
single explanation of the planned response by the lead agency once it
decides to release the details.
Once a decision to release details of the plan is made, the
information released should, of course, be accurate. Philadelphia's
experience with public confusion over parking regulations illustrates
how important accurate information is. New York's approach of having a
single information source at the Command Center responsible for keeping
the media informed is perhaps the best model to follow. At a time when
confusion among the public is bound to increase, confusion among those
implementing the response actions is not at all desirable.
Monitoring the response actions and their impacts on travel
is an activity that should be undertaken once the plan implementation
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process has begun and the details of the plan have been made public.
Effective monitoring depends on the establishment of communications
channels from the lead agency to each implementing unit. In New York,
the Command Center served as the hub of the monitoring system. There,
a member of each major agency involved in the response manned telephones
to keep the Center abreast of new information such as peak hour traffic
flow data and survey results of mode of entry and employee absenteeism
levels. The information gathered was used to make adjustments to the
actions initially implemented and to ensure that all the contingency
measures were in fact correctly executed.
To make use of the preparations made in the contingency
planning process, then, there are several issues to be dealt with in
actually implementing and monitoring the response measures. When a plan
is ready for implementation, publicizing its contents is a first step in
the response process. Political considerations can affect the timing of
the plan's release, but once a decision is made to implement the plan,
the media should be provided with an accurate package of information
and, ideally, should receive all of this information from a central
source. In addition, a pre-determined system for monitoring the imple-
mentation process should be established and maintained to ensure that
all the planned actions are implemented and to provide for response
flexibility.
120.
The success of a transit service disruption contingency
planning effort depends primarily on the effectiveness of the measures
implemented, at least as perceived by both those implementing and being
affected by the contingency measures. The plan itself plays perhaps the
biggest role in determining how the response effort is perceived at
street level, as the transportation measures used in a transit stoppage
response are the most visible aspects of the entire contingency planning
process. The specific measures selected are influenced by the objec-
tives set for the entire contingency response process, which can in turn
be influenced by numerous factors specific to the disruption under
consideration. An effective contingency response plan provides for the
implementation of the selected measures in a structured framework that
remains flexible enough to permit adaptation throughout the disruption.
Once a disruption begins, additional issues of plan implementation,
information dissemination, and plan performance monitoring must be ad-
dressed.
The success of a response plan, as mentioned, is heavily
dependent on the perceptions of officials, media, and especially the
general public of the extent to which the planned response helps to
mitigate the hardships and confusion associated with a transit service
disruption. Once the contingency plan has been implemented effectively,
then, the primary objectives of the contingency planning process have
been fulfilled. There are, however, additional impacts of contingency
planning which can be realized after the disruption ends, and these
impacts are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPACTS OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING AFTER DISRUPTIONS
One final issue arising from the preparation and implementa-
tion of a contingency plan, one which may not be as obvious to those in
the midst of preparing a response to an imminent transit service stop-
page, involves the period after the disruption or threat of disruption
has passed. As mentioned in Chapter One, both the process adopted for
contingency planning and the actual implementation of response measures
can leave long-term transportation-related impacts after the disruption
ends. Because any crisis or other disruption to routine can act as a
"device of change",[l] the physical and organizational changes induced
by contingency planning for a transit stoppage, along with the poten-
tial for consciously using the process to induce such changes, merit
further discussion.
This chapter outlines how the contingency planning processes
studied served to change both the transportation system and the urban
transportation planning arena in each case. First, for the two cases in
which response measures were actually implemented, the extent to which
any innovative transportation policies or projects initiated for the
disruptions were retained for permanent use is examined. The influence
of each contingency planning experience on institutional arrangements
and inter-organizational relationships in the urban transportation
planning context is then briefly summarized. An assessment of the very
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practical long-term impacts of an initial contingency planning effort
- the establishment of a response procedure and an actual response plan
that can be re-used in future situations - is included in this discus-
sion of institutional impacts. Finally, the possibility of actively
making use of a "crisis" situation and a contingency planning process to
direct both types of change, based on the characteristics of disrupted
organizations, is explored.
1. Transportation System Impacts
The most readily evident long-term impact of a transit
service interruption that involves the implementation of specific trans-
portation measures is the retention of the more successful measures for
use after the disruption is over. While the more drastic, large-scale
measures such as auto occupancy restrictions in downtown areas or
bridge and tunnel flow reversals may not be appropriate as permanent
fixtures in the transportation system, many of the measures available
for use during a transit service stoppage, as mentioned earlier, are in
fact Transportation Systems Management (TSM) techniques designed to make
more efficient use of existing roadways.
The New York City transit strike response provides the best
example from the three cases of how temporary measures can be integrated
into the transportation system for permanent use. A study of the
effectiveness of the transportation measures employed during the strike
concluded that the success of some of the measures indicated a need for
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their adoption in order to relieve congestion and to make better use of
the transportation network after the strike ended.[2] As a result, a
number of contingency measures were maintained after the strike, some
were reimplemented, and several others were designated for further
evaluation.
Among the measures retained for permanent use were exclusive-
use streets and separate bicycle lanes on streets in the Manhattan core.
Sections of Madison Avenue, chronically congested during most of the
business day, were designated for limited use by buses, taxis, and local
delivery vehicles during the peak periods of congestion. Acceptance of
the Madison Avenue restrictions in turn prompted further studies of
where similar restrictions could be effective. On the other hand, the
physically separate bicycle lanes on downtown arterials, constructed in
response to the popularity of temporary bicycle lanes during the 1980
transit strike, have not been as well accepted. The bicycle lanes were
not only underutilized, as strike-bound bicyclists returned to their
original modes of travel, but actually seemed to increase the number of
bicycle-vehicle collisions by giving cyclists a false sense of security
from motor vehicles.
Many of the more simple physical changes made to highway
ramps, toll collection facilities, and major intersections to improve
traffic flows during the transit strike have also been maintained. The
possibility of permanently implementing some of the more extensive
measures, such as auto occupancy restrictions in Manhattan or on major
access routes, and taxi sharing regulations, is being further evaluated
124.
in terms of feasibility.
The fairly extensive and detailed response plan used in New
York City thus generated a number of longer-term impacts in the form of
actual changes to the transportation system, and even more in the form
of potential policy changes subjected to more detailed evaluation. The
Philadelphia response plan, far less structured and less extensive in
terms of the transportation measures it contained, not surprisingly, did
not have the same long-term impacts. The limited transportation-related
measures employed during the SEPTA strike were all discontinued once the
disruption ended. Still, it can be argued that the limited response
effort in Philadelphia did generate some lasting effects on urban trans-
portation in that city.
While City-led promotion of ride-sharing during the strike
was limited to providing remote carpool staging areas and encouraging
its own employees to carpool to work, the efforts of the Chamber of
Commerce to encourage other major employers to initiate their own
ride-sharing programs were substantial. The resultant experiences of
commuters with the ride-sharing concept during the transit strike could
have provided some incentive to continue carpooling once the strike
ended. Although such a shift in commuting patterns is difficult to ac-
curately estimate, its occurrence is reflected in the significant
ridership decreases experienced by large transit systems after labor
strikes or other disruptions.[3]
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The Philadelphia response experience was one in which new
transportation measures were not extensively used as part of the strike
response and, consequently, were not retained for permanent use. The
potential for maintaining contingency measures implemented in a disrup-
ted environment, however, was clearly demonstrated by the New York
experience. The possibility of taking advantage of a disrupted environ-
ment to implement and maintain certain transportation measures is thus
an important planning issue, one which is discussed further in a later
section of this chapter.
2. Institutional and Organizational Impacts
Whether pre-determined by contingency planners or not, the
retention of temporary transportation measures for permanent use is a
readily apparent, physical impact of a contingency planning and response
process. A more subtle remnant of such an experience can involve the
inter-agency relationships which make up the urban transportation
planning arena in a given metropolitan area. In some instances,
planning for a possible transit system disruption may be a means of
establishing inter-agency coordination and relationships that can be
maintained as part of the normal transportation planning process. A
cooperative contingency planning effort can provide a link between
interests previously unrelated with respect to transportation issues.
The Boston response planning effort, for example, was one
oriented at least partially toward business community concerns about
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transportation service to the downtown core. The involvement of the
private sector in planning a transit system shutdown response was seen
by City officials as presenting an opportunity to establish and maintain
increased business community participation in transportation planning
activities in general. Even though the contingency plan was never
implemented, the government-business links established in the urgent
atmosphere prior to a potential system shutdown had Boston planners
talking about the possibility of "new planning directions" for transpor-
tation in the metropolitan area.[4]
A similar relationship between City government and private
business interests, with a little more conscious effort on the part of
the contingency planners, could easily have been generated in both
New York and Philadelphia. Many of the measures contained in transit
stoppage contingency plans require cooperation from employers and their
employees, making improved government/business relationships with
respect to urban transportation policy-making a readily achievable
long-term benefit of contingency planning.
It is also possible that participation in a comprehensive
contingency planning process may improve (or establish) relationships
among different government agencies at the same or different jurisdic-
tions or levels. Although the impact of contingency planning on such
relationships for routine planning or implementation activities is hard
to determine, the impact in terms of the present and future disruptions
can be substantial. New York's development of an Emergency Management
Plan demonstrates how the establishment of inter-agency relationships in
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the form of communication and coordination made the planning and imple-
mentation of the 1980 Transit Strike Contingency Plan a smoother process.
While not evident in all the situations studied (in Boston,
politics of the transit crisis meant that relationships among some
government agencies deteriorated instead of improving), the experience
of planning for and responding to a transit stoppage in a unified way
can positively affect inter-organizational relationships. Even if these
changes do nothing to change the urban transportation planning routine,
they are more than likely to make contingency planning for future dis-
ruptions a less complicated process.
Planning for future disruptions, given an initial contingency
planning effort, is likely to be less complicated both because of the
relationships established in the process and because of the fact that
the plan which was formulated can be re-used in the event of another
similar disruption. Many of the measures needed will likely be identi-
cal in a future contingency plan and, more importantly, any cooperative
attitudes established among the responding agencies will not be
forgotten.
Philadelphia City officials and the police department have,
over the course of several transit strikes, developed a response plan
which requires only minor modification and updating each time it is
used. Similarly, Boston officials now consider their unused plan to be
the basis for any future contingency response. The usefulness of a past
contingency planning effort in future situations can be even greater
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where an emergency management framework exists, as it does in New York.
There, the continuity provided by the presence of the Emergency Control
Board ensures that the experience of the 1980 transit strike will be of
value in responding to future disruptions of any kind.
The institutional arrangements and inter-organizational
relationships in existence in an urban area, while less visible to the
general public than the characteristics of the transportation network,
can therefore also be affected by a contingency planning and response
effort. Although less readily apparent in the immediate aftermath of a
disruption, organizational and institutional changes may carry with them
greater long-term ramifications than physical changes to the transpor-
tation network. Whether new actors become involved in urban transporta-
tion issues as a result of the contingency planning experience or new
links become established between formerly isolated actors, the potential
for further innovation or change to the urban transportation planning
process can be great. In addition, no matter what aspects of the
routine transportation planning process are affected, the initial con-
tingency planning effort is almost certain to leave behind both inter-
organizational relationships and a response plan that can be of benefit
in future disruptions.
3. Contingency Planning as An Opportunity to Direct Change
Both the physical network changes and the institutional and
organizational changes discussed above imply that the policy- and
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decision-making environment is somehow altered during the period before,
and especially during, a transit service disruption. As suggested in
the literature, the atmosphere of urgency which accompanies most crisis
situations carries with it a potential for a more ready acceptance of
change on the part of the involved actors. This change can come about
during periods of disruption when the agencies involved develop a
"recognition that previous modes of coping have been [or will be] in-
adequate and change is necessary".[5]
During crisis-like situations, then, the political and
institutional barriers that normally tend to obstruct the adoption of
new transportation policies or projects may in fact give way to a
temporary willingness on the part of major actors to accept proposals
for such projects in the interest of providing a unified response to the
disruption. Although the initial reaction to a disruption by an organi-
zation usually reflects a strong resistance to change, there is a phase
in planning for and responding to a disrupted situation when the need to
adapt to the disruption will make innovation more acceptable.[6] The
fifth and final proposition set forth in Chapter One postulates that a
well thought-out contingency planning process can be consciously used by
planners to take advantage of this need to adapt in a disruption to
effectively direct any changes that may occur.
It is not clear from either the New York or Philadelphia
experiences with preparing and implementing contingency plans that the
planners involved had any "hidden agenda" or plans to use the process to
130.
implement a controversial or innovative transportation policy or pro-
ject. The success and acceptance of several measures during the New
York strike and their retention after the strike, however, does indicate
that such an approach to getting certain innovative transportation
projects accepted could prove to be quite successful.
In Boston, where the contingency plan was not used, planners
were at least partially disappointed that it was not implemented because
they had hoped to see some of the measures they proposed achieve success
and public acceptance during a transit system shutdown, thereby
encouraging permanent adoption. For example, they felt that taxi
jitney-type services along major streets would have been a great suc-
cess during an absence of transit service, and that keeping them for
permanent use would have been an innovative step forward for transporta-
tion in Boston. Similarly, encouraging employers to implement staggered
work hours in response to a transit service interruption was perceived
by planners as an opportunity to introduce the concept and to demon-
strate its effectiveness.
While the cases examined do not provide a clear example of
contingency planners successfully manipulating the response plan or
planning process to promote a specific transportation policy or project
innovation, it is clear that the characteristics necessary for such an
effort were present in each of the cases. If one looks at change or
innovation as a three-stage process of unfreezing, changing, and
re-freezing the environment,[7] then the period before and during an
urban transit stoppage can be viewed as one in which the many agencies
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and organizations involved experience various degrees of "unfreezing",
depending on how serious the threat of a disruption is. Planners hoping
to use this opportunity to promote specific programs must therefore
arrange to have them approved and implemented for the response effort,
before the environment enters the "re-freezing" phase.
This concept of "re-freezing" is important because there
tends to be a point during transit service disruptions after which the
disruption is no longer perceived to be a "crisis" by those involved.
Once the response plan has been implemented and each affected agency or
organization has adapted to the situation, the willingness to accept
innovative actions will diminish. This was the case in New York where,
in spite of the fairly obvious success of the many transportation
measures implemented for the transit strike, many City officials were in
favor of having everything return to normal after the strike ended.[8]
The efforts of the City's Department of Transportation, supported by the
Mayor, were what kept many of the temporary actions alive, either as
actual continuing projects or as potential projects subjected to further
study.
Consciously inducing changes to the transportation network or
to the transportation planning arena in an urban area may not be pos-
sible in all situations involving a contingency response to a transit
service disruption. Those leading the plan preparation process should
nevertheless be aware of this potential and, if some new policy or
project is to be tested during the disruption, should take into account
the aspects of the situation that could hinder any "unfreezing". As
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well, the implications of the projects to be tested or promoted have to
be considered, particularly with respect to the likelihood of their
acceptance by the general public. As mentioned in Chapter Four, con-
tingency transportation measures that are overly complex or which take a
long time to correctly implement would be inappropriate for use during a
disruption, and are likely to be rejected by those affected by them.
The cases discussed above demonstrate that the entire contin-
gency planning effort, together with the actual plan produced, can have
significant and potentially beneficial impacts on the transportation
policy-making and planning environment after the disruption has ended.
Although the measures contained in a response plan are the most visible
impacts of contingency planning from the point-of-view of the general
public, contingency planners should consider post-disruption effects of
their planning effort for several reasons. First, a transit service
stoppage can present a unique opportunity to implement transportation
actions that under normal circumstances would not be adopted or would
at least require a long approval process. As well, the relationships
established among agencies and other interests during the planning
process may lead to the involvement of new actors in the urban transpor-
tation planning process. Careful consideration of such post-disruption
impacts by contingency planners can allow some effort to be made in
terms of guiding these impacts. Finally, whether or not such an effort
is productive, the effort put into developing a transit service disrup-
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tion contingency plan will always produce a response procedure and a
response plan that can be used again in future disruptions.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE POLITICS OF TRANSIT SERVICE DISRUPTIONS
The preceding discussions of the process of contingency
planning, characteristics of the actual response plan, implementation
considerations, and the potential impacts of contingency planning in the
aftermath of a transit service stoppage, have all included some mention
of the political atmosphere which can accompany such a disruption. The
cases studied involved differing degrees of political confrontation over
the disruption at hand, meaning the contingency planning process was in
each case at least partially influenced by political considerations.
Because a contingency plan can become a political document subject to
the unique pressures of politics in a particular metropolitan area,
those responsible for producing the plan should recognize both the
political influences on their efforts and the influence of the plan they
produce on the politics of a given disruption.
The politics of transit service disruptions, as an input into
and an output of the contingency planning process, are examined in this
chapter. The constraints imposed on, and the opportunities provided to,
contingency planners by political considerations are discussed first.
The potential political implications of the actual plan produced on the
manner in which it is publicized and implemented are then addressed.
As was the case with all of the aspects of contingency
planning discussed thus far, the three cases studied provide examples of
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the ways in which politics can enter the planning process. In examining
political considerations, however, it becomes apparent that contingency
planning in Boston for a transit stoppage caused by an intergovernmental
funding dispute was a far more political exercise than planning for the
transit labor strikes in either New York or Philadelphia. The political
issues that can arise in labor strike and funding dispute situations are
therefore discussed separately in each of the following sections, and in
turn highlight the fact that generalizations with respect to the politi-
cal environments in different metropolitan areas under different circum-
stances are difficult to make.
1. Political Influences on Contingency Planning
The influence of political considerations on contingency
planning for an urban transit stoppage can be related both to the nature
of the conflict that leads to the disruption and to the effectiveness of
the actual contingency plan in demonstrating the competence of the
government agency responsible for implementing the response. These
influences on the planning process involve the political image of those
responsible, or perceived by the public as being responsible, for
initiating and leading a contingency planning effort. A contingency
plan is closely associated with the leaders and officials who adopt it.
If it proves to be effective, they can claim credit; if it proves to be
a failure, they will have to take the blame. The impact of this on
contingency planning in the urban context is that "many of the finer
136.
points of public policy [can] become overwhelmed by the necessity for a
clear governmental presence ... just to maintain reasonable public
order. Many of the actions taken during a crisis may be made for
symbolic impact upon people's general behavior, more than for the
specific effect they have".[1]
Apart from the expected public perception of the effective-
ness of a contingency plan in a disruption, public opinion with respect
to the cause of the transit service stoppage can also influence the
response preparation process. If public opinion appears to be in sup-
port of, for example, the position of City officials or the Mayor with
respect to the dispute over wages or funding arrangements, the Mayor may
be more likely to initiate and support a contingency planning process.
It is possible, however, that some segments of the public (i.e.
constituencies) will either disagree with the position taken by the
City, or feel that City officials should be putting their efforts into
solving the dispute rather than planning for a service stoppage.
The opinions and interests of different constituencies in the
urban political environment can thus play a major role in either
promoting or impeding the efforts of contingency planners, through the
political pressure that can be applied to elected officials. Among the
most powerful constituencies likely to influence the contingency
planning process are the affected labor unions and labor interests in
general, and private business interests, both of which can act to either
promote or impede the re-election chances of the leaders responsible.
In addition, broader constituencies such as suburban commuters and inner
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city transit dependents, each with potentially different concerns, have
to be considered by City officials in their efforts to lead a contingency
response. Because it would be impossible to serve the interests of all
constituencies in undertaking a response process, political decisions
have to be made with respect to the approach to be taken in developing a
response plan and the amount of implicit or explicit support to be given
to the effort by civic leaders.
Several of the political considerations mentioned above were
evident in each of the cases studied, affecting the type of support
given to contingency planning by the leaders involved. In New York City,
the general consensus among City officials was that public opinion
seemed to support the City's position in the labor dispute.[2] As a
result, the Mayor was able to effectively lead the process and to make
himself visible throughout the transit strike at daily press briefings
about the response effort. The concern of New York officials over
public reaction to the contingency plan and its measures appeared to be
even greater than their concern over public opinion of the labor strike.
Given the great potential for chaotic conditions in the New York
situation, contingency planners there had to ensure that the public
support for the City's position could be sustained by preparing and
implementing a detailed, and ultimately effective, response plan. The
political atmosphere in New York, therefore, was such that the Mayor and
City officials had few reservations about fully supporting and being
associated with the response effort.
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In the case of Philadelphia's labor dispute, public opinion
was even more clearly behind the City's position in the contract
negotiations with transit workers.[3] The approach taken in contingency
planning, however, was much less open than in the New York case. In
Philadelphia, it was the City's Office of the Managing Director that
initiated and led the response effort. The Mayor did not become
directly involved in either preparing for or responding to the transit
strike, primarily because the Mayor's Office did not want to influence
the ongoing negotiations by taking a stand and committing itself to a
contingency plan.
The reluctance of the Mayor to be associated with the re-
sponse effort in turn affected the nature of Philadelphia's contingency
preparations, as the Office of the Managing Director focussed its plan
primarily on City employees and proposed only a limited number of
actions designed to reduce travel problems for the public in general.
As mentioned previously, the clear public support for the City's
position in the Philadelphia situation meant that a far more extensive
contingency planning and response effort would likely have been accepted
and supported by the public. The Mayor's desire to stay out of the
contract dispute issue, however, limited both the scope and scale of the
Philadelphia response.
A similar desire by the Mayor of Boston to avoid commitment
to any one position or course of action in the MBTA funding conflict
greatly influenced the contingency planning process there, although the
issues of political constituencies and public opinion were far more
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complicated than in either of the labor strike situations. In Boston,
the conflict was not as clear-cut as "management versus labor", but
involved the Mayor of Boston, representatives of all the other cities
and towns in the MBTA service area, the Governor, and State Legislators,
all of whom had at least partial say over how the funding dispute would
be resolved. From the perspective of the Mayor of Boston, the MBTA's
financial predicament was an issue to be resolved by action on the part
of the Governor or the Legislature, not by increased subsidies from
Boston's property tax revenues.
This perspective, when combined with public opinion survey
results that placed very little of the "blame" for the MBTA's condition
on the Mayor,[4] meant that a contingency planning effort would have to
be of very low profile until the system actually shut down. The City
wanted to "keep the heat" on the State level to avert a shutdown by
approving the required additional operating funds, and common knowledge
of an ongoing contingency planning process could have implied that
Boston officials were prepared and willing to accept a disruption. Not
only would this knowledge have reduced pressure on the Governor to find
a solution, but it could have been used by political opponents to sug-
gest that Boston officials were placing more effort into preparing for
a shutdown than into finding a solution, and were in effect the "cause"
of a shutdown. In addition, the general desire of the Mayor to keep a
distance between himself and MBTA issues in general appeared to keep the
planning process a fairly low-key operation.
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The result of the above political considerations in the
Boston case was that a Transit Emergency Task Force was not established
by the City until just a few weeks before the potential shutdown date.
Once it was established, it consisted of private sector representatives,
not City staff. The activities of the Task Force were not publicized,
and the plan which was ultimately developed was not released to the
media until the shutdown actually began. The initiation and overall
approach to contingency planning for a transit stoppage was thus
significantly influenced by the political atmosphere in the Boston
situation, and to lesser extents, in both labor strike cases as well.
Apart from affecting the way in which a contingency planning
process is started and led, and the approach taken in preparing a
response plan, political concerns can also manifest themselves in more
explicit impacts on the planning process. Once the planning effort has
been started, aspects of the politics of the given disruption can affect
the motivation and participation in the process of both the public
agencies and private interests that will have a role in a contingency
response, The involvement of both types of organization may depend on
issues like the position in the dispute each group supports, what each
group has to gain (or lose) from participating in the process, and
whether or not jurisdictional differences will pose a problem, all of
which can be affected by the politics surrounding the disruption.
The impact on contingency planning of taking sides in the
conflict at hand was most apparent in the Boston case. There, contin-
gency planners had to be very careful as to which agencies could be
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expected to cooperate in the City-led response to an MBTA shutdown.
Because of the heated dispute between the city and state governments
over who should provide additional operating subsidies, planners quickly
discovered that state agencies and those under the control of the
Governor would not be cooperative in a response effort.[5] The contin-
gency plan developed was thus limited primarily to agencies and groups
under the control of the City, or operating solely within Boston's
boundaries.
Jurisdictional problems, although not as politically induced
as those in Boston, also limited the contingency planning effort in
Philadelphia. The limited planning effort, as mentioned, involved only
City agencies, and no attempt was made to coordinate any of the actions
with adjacent municipalities or the regional planning agency. In fact,
a somewhat surprising characteristic of all three planning processes
examined was that, no matter how detailed or structured the response
plan proved to be, it tended to be focussed on the activities of agencies
under direct control of the lead organizations.
Apart from strictly political considerations of the position
to take in the conflict, or whose jurisdiction would be affected by
response actions, the issue of what each organization felt it would gain
or lose by participating in a response effort appeared to be very
important in influencing the nature of each response. For example, the
police departments were heavily involved in both planning and implemen-
ting the response, not only because of their close ties to the lead
agency in each case, but in more practical terms, because the police
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officers involved stood to collect extra overtime pay during a response
effort. Private business interests, on the other hand, seemed reluctant
to fully cooperate in the planning processes no matter how much they
were involved in actual preparations, because they would only lose
business in the event of a transit system shutdown. In the Boston case,
where downtown retailers were kept informed of the contingency planning
process, the retailers felt that the City should have been putting its
efforts into averting a shutdown during the very profitable Christmas
shopping season rather than trying to involve them in a response
effort.[6]
For those responsible for preparing a contingency response
plan for a transit service stoppage, the influence of political consi-
derations on motivating certain agencies and organizations to cooperate
in, avoid, or even sabotage the planning and implementation effort
becomes very important. In general, it would be wise for contingency
planners in any situation involving a potential transit service disrup-
tion to consciously identify all the actors likely to become involved in
or have some impact on a response effort, as well as the major consti-
tuencies to be affected by any actions on the part of City officials,
and to assess their positions with respect to the politics of the
situation. Such an assessment should include both likely supporters and
opponents of any contingency plan, so that the plan which is ultimately
developed relies only on those groups expected to be cooperative. An
assessment of the actors involved in the Boston situation, for example,
could have resembled the chart presented in Exhibit 6-1. Actors like
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ACTOR/POTENTIAL
PARTICIPANT
LIKELY POSITION ON
MBTA SHUTDOWN ISSUE
EXPECTED LEVEL OF SUPPORT
FOR A CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
Governor's Office
Other State Agencies
Port Authority
State Legislature
Downtown Retailers
Major Employers
Taxi Operators
Parking Lot
Operators
Transit Unions
News Media
Police Department
Other Cities and
Towns
Boston Voters
-major opponent of
Mayor of Boston
-controlled or in-
fluenced by Governor
-influenced by
Governor
-mixed; some support
for revamping MBTA
-want MBTA operating
at any cost during
pre-Christmas season
-would like to see the
issue resolved; but
need transportation
for employees
-attracted to possible
extra revenues during
a shutdown
-may see marginal
increase in revenues
during a shutdown
-MBTA problems are all
to blame on management
and-politicians
-whatever will provide
the "best story"
-under City direction
-potential allies
-most don't care; have
not blamed MBTA prob-
lems on the Mayor to
date
-NONE
-ALMOST NONE
-ALMOST NONE
-unable to help directly
-MINIMAL; except if efforts
are made to provide core
area shuttle bus service
-if a shutdown is inevitable,
potentially HIGH for
journey to work measures
-HIGH; City contols taxi
licensing; jitney services
could be lucrative
-HIGH; City controls rates
and licensing
-NONE; may picket any effort
to provide substitute bus
service
-will publicize the plan,
but will also emphasize con-
gestion and plan foul-ups
-HIGH; will enforce the plan;
officers want overtime pay
-HIGH; IF problems of coor-
dination and communications
can be overcome
-will support most measures;
may resent excessive cater-
ing to suburban commuters
EXHIBIT 6-1: EXAMPLE OF AN ACTOR/PARTICIPANT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
1980 MBTA CRISIS IN BOSTON
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city agencies, state agencies, agencies from surrounding jurisdictions,
business interests, and the media all had potential impacts on the
Boston response effort, and contingency planners had to, whether con-
sciously or not, take these impacts into account.
Political considerations, as reflected in the issues of
public opinion, political image, jurisdictional disputes, and positions
taken with respect to the transit disruption, can also influence the
actual contents of the contingency plan produced, its measures, and most
of all its eventual implementation. The way in which the jurisdictions
and perspectives of different organizations affect their participation
in a response was outlined above. The same concerns in turn can affect
which transportation measures are included in the plan.
Public opinion and concerns over the constituencies to be
affected by the response were particularly important in influencing the
type of measure included in at least two of the plans. In both Boston
and Philadelphia, efforts to supply alternative transportation services
were not made, primarily because officials in both cases felt that such
efforts would be perceived by the labor unions as a form of "strike-
breaking". Alternative transportation services could have been picketed
by those on strike or locked out, thereby impeding the implementation of
the services and possibly generating an adverse public reaction to the
contingency response effort. In general, contingency transportation
measures were selected, at least in part, according to the anticipated
reactions of those to be involved in the response, those to be directly
affected by the measure, as well as overall public opinion.
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Contingency planners in all the cases had to deal with and
react to the political atmosphere surrounding each disruption to some
extent. In the most politically volatile situation, Boston's MBTA
crisis, contingency planners did not explicitly tailor the response plan
to the image and constituency concerns of the political leaders involved,
although the most controversial actions such as substitute bus services
were not included. Boston's planners attempted to develop what they
felt was the most appropriate set of contingency measures for the
situation, influenced relatively little by direct political pressures.
Political manoeuvering did, however, have an influence on the use of the
finished product, as the contingency planners saw their plan kept away
from the media and the public until a shutdown in fact occurred.
The task of contingency planners in general, in dealing with
the political influences on their efforts, thus becomes one of balancing
their own opinions of the contingency measures "needed" to keep the
urban area functioning against political constraints and the attitudes
of other agencies and jurisdictions involved with the plan, integrating
the feasible alternatives into a workable response. In cases where
potentially controversial actions such as auto occupancy restrictions
prove to be necessary for an effective response, planners may have to
focus on strategies to secure approval of the proposed actions. In any
event, the contingency planning process should include some attempt to
identify both the actors and political constraints that could limit the
planning effort and to adapt the resultant plan when necessary.
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Because the actual political influences on the contingency
planning process will vary widely from one situation to the next, the
reactions of contingency planners to these influences are difficult to
specify in any greater detail. It is important for planners to realize,
however, that there can be considerable influences on their efforts at-
tributable to the often heated political debates which tend to accompany
transit service disruptions. In turn, as is discussed in the next
section, planners should also be aware of how their efforts can be used
to influence the potential outcome of these political conflicts.
2. Contingency Planning As a Political Weapon
Just as the politics of a transit service disruption can
influence the contingency planning process and the plan that is produced,
it is possible that both the process and the plan itself can be employed
to influence the resolution of the conflict causing the disruption in
the first place. This possibility has implications for the response
planning effort in terms of how it is used to establish a position for
the lead agency with respect to the dispute, how it is publicized and
implemented if a disruption does indeed occur, and how the costs of
planning and implementing a comprehensive response to a transit stoppage
are rationalized.
At the outset, the decision by a Mayor or a City administra-
tion to undertake a response planning effort prior to a transit service
disruption can have implications with respect to the labor or funding
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dispute behind the disruption. As mentioned previously, an effort to
prepare a contingency plan can be perceived by other actors in the con-
flict as reflecting a willingness on the part of the lead agency (the
City) to accept a transit stoppage rather than give in to the wage or
funding demands made by transit labor or management respectively. This
interpretation of the planning effort was something community leaders
tried to avoid in both Philadelphia and Boston.
In the case of Philadelphia's labor negotiations, the Mayor's
Office felt that there was a distinct possibility that widespread
publicity of a planning effort could influence the outcome of the
negotiations.[7] Labor representatives, it was thought, could have
accused the City of "bargaining in bad faith" had the contingency
planning process been publicized. The businesses and retailers opposed
to any kind of stoppage could also have negatively interpreted a full-
scale response planning effort. The decision in the Philadelphia
situation was thus not to use the contingency plan as a political
weapon, but rather to use it only as a response if a strike occurred.
Nevertheless, the concern of City officials over this issue suggests
that the potential for using the plan, either explicitly or implicitly,
as a firm statement of the City's position was very real.
This potential was recognized and came closer to being
realized to a greater extent in the Boston MBTA funding dispute. In
that situation, the "negotiations" involved elected representatives at
different levels of government and from different jurisdictions, meaning
the City of Boston could have taken a very firm stand on the issue of
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additional subsidies from tax revenues. By making everyone aware of the
detailed preparations which were being made in anticipation of an MBTA
shutdown, Boston City officials could have emphasized just how serious
they were about refusing to allocate any more operating funds. On the
other hand, such publicity might have been exploited by political op-
ponents of the Mayor, who could have suggested that the City was doing
nothing to find a solution and would therefore be responsible for any
shutdown.
The risk of this occurring apparently kept the Mayor from
publicizing the planning process before the disruption. Plan prepara-
tions were kept fairly secretive, except for a partial leak of the plan
details to one of the local newspapers about a week before the eventual
shutdown.[8] The contingency planners, from a strictly practical view-
point, wanted to publicize the details of the plan well in advance so
that the public would be familiar with the proposed measures. They
realized, however, that the Mayor was not about to "play his hand" until
the last possible opportunity. As it turned out, the process was kept
out of the media (although it was common knowledge that there existed
some form of response plan), and the system was shut down when a
compromise solution could not be reached, allowing the Mayor to release
the plan on the following day. By doing this, the Mayor could both
point to state level officials as the culprits and offer his plan to
keep the city functioning during the shutdown.
The question of when the planned response should be made
public is thus one which surfaced both in Boston and Philadelphia.
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Publicizing the process and the plan too far in advance can not only
generate a perception that the lead agency "wants" a disruption to
occur, it can also leave the.process and the plan's details exposed to
public criticism by its opponents. This seemed to be a major concern of
Boston's Task Force.[9] On the other hand, keeping the plan secret
until the disruption begins means that any advantages of advance notice
for the general public are lost. (The agencies to be involved in
implementing the measures, however, should be fully aware of the plan's
details.) In the final analysis, much to the chagrin of those preparing
the contingency plan, political concerns like the ones outlined above
will tend to dictate the way in which the plan is publicized or used to
influence the dispute at hand.
The final way in which a contingency planning process can
have an impact on the politics of the dispute under consideration
involves the rationale for contingency planning in the first place, and
is clearly interrelated with many of the political aspects already
mentioned. A commitment to prepare and implement a contingency response
can be viewed by City officials as an investment, not only in keeping
the urban area functional during a disruption, but also as an investment
in resolving the funding or wage dispute in their favor. The many
political considerations associated with a transit stoppage may mean
that a contingency planning process can be initiated to reduce travel
hardships during the disruption, to demonstrate a refusal to give in to
political opponents, and to reduce the amount of money spent in doing
SO.
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During a labor strike, for example, it could be argued that
if the funds spent on the contingency response are less than the subsidy
funds that would be spent to meet labor's demands and keep the transit
system running, then the investment in the response effort is economi-
cally worthwhile. Not surprisingly, none of the officials involved in
the three cases examined even hinted that such logic was part of their
effort. The labor unions to be put out of work by the transit system
shutdowns, on the other hand, clearly articulated their belief that such
a rationalization for contingency planning was indeed on the minds of
the officials involved.
It is worth emphasizing that the contingency planning pro-
cesses in the three cases studied were not used to a great extent as
political weapons by the leaders involved. The very fact that such
actions are possible, and thought probable by some of the parties
involved in the respective disputes, however, means that contingency
planners should recognize the possibility. In the Boston funding dis-
pute, for example, a not too unlikely scenario could have seen the City
take a very firm stand with respect to additional subsidies, preparing
and implementing an extensive contingency response as a symbol of its
willingness to live without transit service, and rationalizing the whole
effort, by proving that less tax money was being spent than on routine
days. Such a move would have been extremely daring politically, but
nevertheless possible, and it does present an alternative approach to
dealing with similar disputes in the future.
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The use of the contingency planning process as a political
weapon to influence the resolution of the disputes over funding, wages,
or other issues was therefore limited in practice. In the cases
studied, the concern of city leaders and thus contingency planners
seemed to be more on avoiding the situations which could prove to in-
fluence the disputes. Details of the planning processes and the plans
themselves were generally kept away from the media until a transit
stoppage became inevitable. Whether the contingency planning efforts
actually influenced any of the disputes or not, it is apparent that the
planning efforts undertaken were inextricable from the politics of the
situations.
In summary, those given the task of preparing a contingency
response to a potential transit service disruption in an urban area are
likely to see much of their effort influenced, if not directed, by
political considerations. The more heated the political debate over the
disruption is, the bigger the role politics will tend to play in the
response planning and implementation effort. The concerns of decision-
makers over political constituencies and public opinion may influence
how and when the planning process is initiated, the overall approach
taken in making preparations, the parties to be involved in a response
effort, and even the specific transportation measures to be used. These
same concerns may in turn affect the way in which the plan is implemen-
ted, or used symbolically to influence the resolution of the political
dispute.
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No matter how "political" a given transit disruption proves
to be, the planners involved in preparing a contingency plan have to
recognize that there exists the possibility that their efforts to keep
the urban area operating during a transit stoppage may be constrained by
forms of political "one-upmanship" as the disruption draws near. Apart
from identifying all the parties likely to have an impact on the process
and their respective positions with respect to the political conflict of
the situation, a generalized approach for contingency planners to follow
in dealing with political issues is difficult to develop. The politics
of transit service disruptions can vary greatly from city to city and
from one situation to the next. Still, their influence on contingency
planning efforts can be substantial, and should be kept in mind as a
framework for contingency planning is developed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSIT STOPPAGE CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Throughout this thesis, the various issues and characteristics
that make contingency planning a fairly unique process in the urban
transportation planning arena have been discussed, with actual
experiences from three cases providing some empirical background. The
discussions of the issues likely to be faced by planners and decision-
makers given the responsibility for developing and implementing a response
to a transit system shutdown included relevant observations from the
three cases, and suggestions of what planners in general could do to deal
with these issues. It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to tie
these observations and suggestions into a generalized framework for
transit stoppage contingency planning, given the many caveats about
making generalizations with respect to situations which can be context-
specific. This chapter begins with a summary of the many ways in which a
contingency planning effort can differ from normal planning activities.
These unique characteristics are then used as a basis for the establish-
ment of a contingency planning framework and response strategy for
metropolitan areas.
1. Summary: The Issues Faced By Contingency Planners
Although any planning effort includes some components that
resemble the basic steps of problem identification, development of
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alternative actions, alternatives analysis and selection, and implemen-
tation, followed by some form of monitoring or feedback, the process of
urban contingency planning can differ in numerous respects. These
differences relate to the nature of the disruption for which the contin-
gency plan is being prepared, the amount of advance warning available
to government officials, and the actors to be involved in a response
effort, all of which can be substantially affected by the political
atmosphere that often surrounds disruptions to public services.
From the perspective of the contingency planner, the charac-
teristics of planning for an urban transit stoppage that distinguish it
from routine urban transportation planning activities can be categorized
as: (1) issues related to the process of contingency planning and
response implementation; (2) aspects of the contingency plan which is
produced; (3) the potential post-disruption impacts of a contingency
planning effort; and (4) political considerations affecting urban transit
stoppages and any attempt to respond to them. These characteristics have
been discussed in the preceding chapters and, based on the results of
previous research and the findings of this study, are summarized below.
A. The Contingency Planning Process
The characteristics of the planning process adopted by those
responsible for preparing a response plan for a transit stoppage can have
impacts at both the intra- and inter-organizational levels for the agencies
involved in or affected by the process. These organizational impacts,
in turn, ultimately determine the manner in which the resulting contingency
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plan is implemented.
At the level of the individual agency, the primary benefit
of contingency planning relates to its ability to prepare its own
operations for the imminent disruption and the response that it will have
to make. This benefit can only be realized by an agency, of course, if
it is both aware of a potential transit service disruption and included
in any coordinated contingency planning effort undertaken by the lead
agency. It is thus the willingness of a lead agency to commit itself to
a contingency planning effort and to include the relevant agencies or
groups in the planning process that determines the extent to which
individual actors can benefit from the effort. Conversely, each actor
has to be willing to participate in a response effort in the first place,
where this willingness can be affected by the politics of the transit
disruption and the agency that is leading the process.
A coordinated contingency planning process depends on the
cooperation of numerous agencies and groups in the metropolitan area.
At the inter-agency level, then, a structured contingency planning
process can in fact create a new decision unit for the response effort,
one composed of representatives from different agencies and responsible
specifically for the development and implementation of a transit stoppage
response plan. The participation of the relevant agencies in such a
"task force" can be affected by the degree of certainty associated with
the occurrence of a transit stoppage, and at a more basic level, by the
expected impact of such a stoppage on each organization. Once again,
issues of which agency takes the lead role, the authority and jurisdiction
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of each of the participants, and public opinion and political image
considerations can all affect the level of coordination achieved. The
cases studied demonstrated that, in general, the more structured the
contingency planning process adopted, the greater its coordinating effect.
Participation of the agencies to be involved in a response
effort in the preparatory stages of the process also seemed to enhance
the implementation process once the disruption became certain. Because
the acceptance of the proposed contingency measures by the agency to be
responsible for their implementation is the key, ensuring the involvement
of implementors in the planning process can promote this acceptance by
giving the agency input into the actual selection of transportation
actions. In addition, such involvement can establish communication links
between the implementing bodies and the lead agency so that the plan
details and agency responsibilities are clearly understood by all. The
role of the planners leading the planning process is then to ensure that
implementation tasks are assigned to the proper organizations by matching
specific contingency measures with the experience, capabilities, and
resources of the organizations involved.
The basis for a comprehensive contingency planning process is
therefore involvement. The likelihood of a coordinated transit stoppage
response is increased when the lead agency is able to effectively
structure the planning process so as to include the agencies required for
a comprehensive response effort in spite of political and jurisdictional
concerns.
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B. The Contingency Plan
No matter what type of planning process is adopted for the
preparation of a contingency plan, planners have to address several
issues related to the characteristics of the plan itself. The objectives
to be met by the response effort, the specific response measures required
for these objectives to be met, and the format and structure of the
contingency plan which is developed are all considerations that can
significantly influence the effectiveness of the eventual response to a
transit stoppage. In addition, as the plan is being developed, the issue
of how the plan will be implemented and monitored should be addressed,
and any constraints identified.
The objectives set for a response effort will depend a great
deal not only on the nature of the specific disruption at hand and the
political atmosphere which surrounds it, but on the characteristics of the
particular urban area involved as well, including its physical geography
and the nature of the inter-agency relationships already in existence.
In general, because of the limited time and resources available to contin-
gency planners in most cases, the focus of the planning effort will be
on the prevention of chaotic travel conditions rather than the provision
of any extensive substitute transportation services during a public
transit service disruption. A common objective for such response efforts
involves facilitating the daily journey to work for commuters headed
toward congested core areas. In all the cases studied, the maintenance
of public safety and the prevention of unmanageable congestion on the
transportation network seemed to be the most important plan objectives.
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The transportation contingency measures that can be used to
help achieve such plan objectives can range from mandatory restrictions
imposed on the individual traveler to simple encouragement of a specific
travel behavior. Measures to increase vehicle occupancy levels can be
used during an absence of public transit service to make the same number
of vehicles carry more passengers. Closely related are traffic flow
improvement measures designed to make the same road network carry more
vehicles. Measures to promote alternative transportation modes will depend
heavily on the availability of such modes in a given metropolitan area.
Because it is generally a complex endeavor to provide substitute services,
promotion of alternative modes will involve measures to expand the
capacity and increase utilization of existing services. Finally,
employer-based transportation measures can be very effective in helping
to reduce the daily peaking of travel demand. For such measures to be
implemented, of course, the cooperation of major employers is essential.
In selecting specific transportation measures for a transit
stoppage contingency plan, planners should refrain from developing
extensive transportation programs that are overly innovative or complex.
Apart from the pragmatic problem of funding such measures, problems
related to the travelling public's ability to quickly adapt to extensive
transportation network changes mean that planners should anticipate how
effective each measure might be and how it will be accepted. Also impor-
tant are the numerous interrelationships among the different measures
proposed for implementation, as some of the measures may in fact serve
different objectives or even conflict with one another.
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Once specific transportation measures have been selected
through the contingency planning process, they must be integrated into a
comprehensive response plan. The plan itself should be structured enough
to explicitly define the contingency actions and the associated implemen-
tation responsibilities, yet be flexible in providing a mechanism for
changing response actions as the disruption evolves and requirements
change. Both characteristics can be present when a two-phase planning
and response process -- a "crisis management framework" -- is adopted.
Such a framework can involve the development of a general response plan
which can be used in any urban transportation disruption. This response
plan would in turn provide a well-established basis for the development
of specific actions and implementation plans when a disruption becomes
imminent.
The contingency plan also has to specify the logistics of
response measure implementation, including how and when the plan details
are to be made public, the communications system to be used by the
agencies involved, and the monitoring and plan modification mechanisms to
be employed. The timing of the plan's release to the media is likely to
be determined by political considerations. Nevertheless, it is important
that there be a single source of information -- a control center -- which
can also serve as a communications center for plan implementors. The
control center, usually established by the lead agency or the contingency
planning team, can permit monitoring of the implementation process and of
the effectiveness of contingency measures, and can provide a centralized
decision-making location for the duration of the disruption.
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C. Post-Disruption Considerations
The development of a contingency response plan, whether the
plan is ultimately implemented or not, can leave impacts both on the
institutional structure of urban transportation planning in a metropolitan
area and on the actual transportation network. Because disruptions to
routine activities can provide an opportunity for change, the potential
for consciously directing such change during the planning process has to
be considered by contingency planners.
The implementation of innovative transportation measures
during a transit stoppage can enable planners to demonstrate the effective-
ness of a new transportation policy or project. Decision-makers, eager
to embrace concepts that will permit an effective and coordinated response
to be made, may set aside the normal approval process because of a lack
of time. Once implemented on a temporary basis, it is possible that the
more successful or popular contingency measures, such as exclusive HOV
lanes or carpool programs, can be retained for permanent use.
The institutional and organizational impacts of a contingency
planning and response effort can have numerous ramifications for future
transportation planning activities in the urban area. New actors may
become involved in transportation and related issues, or new inter-agency
relationships may be established as a result of the contingency planning
process. At the very least, an initial contingency planning effort
should provide a foundation for making a response to future urban transit
or similar transportation disruptions.
From the planners' perspective, the opportunity for change
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provided by a disrupted environment can be an additional benefit to be
realized through the contingency planning process. Because there may be
a more ready acceptance of innovation on the part of decision-makers,
planners might want to use the process to consciously promote an untested
or previously unacceptable trasnportation concept. If this is the case,
planners should develop some form of strategy designed to convince
decision-makers of the need for such measures during a transit stoppage,
to obtain approval, and to have the measures implemented and their
effectiveness monitored during the disruption.
D. Political Considerations in Contingency Planning
Urban transit stoppages generally are the result of some
conflict among different interests over labor contract terms, subsidi-
zation arrangements, or other issues, meaning that political considerations
can play a substantial role in a contingency planning and response effort.
Throughout the plan preparation and implementation process, politics can
have a great deal of influence on how and when the contingency plan is
developed, which actors lead and participate in the response effort, the
measures included in the plan, and the approach adopted for plan imple-
mentation. Conversely, the contingency planning process and the resultant
response plan can potentially be used by certain agencies or officials to
influence the eventual outcome of the dispute behind the transit stoppage.
The specific influences of politics on the contingency planning
process and the plan itself are related to the political environment in
existence in a particular situation and the constituencies that might be
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affected by either the service disruption or a response effort. The
perceptions of various political constituencies, including the "general
public", of both the issues behind the impending transit stoppage and
the efforts made by government agencies and decision-makers to either
avert or plan for the stoppage can effectively determine the involvement
of elected officials in a response effort and the amount of support given
to contingency planners. Constituency concerns can in turn affect when
a planning process is officially initiated, the amount of cooperation
given to the planning effort by other public agencies and private
interests, the extent to which controversial measures are included in the
response plan, and the timing of plan release and implementation once a
stoppage becomes certain. Those involved in developing a contingency plan
must therefore be able to identify all the actors to be linked to their
response plan and to assess the likely positions of these actors with
respect to the disruption and the response effort in general.
In certain volatile political situations, the process of
contingency planning can have the potential to be used as a political
weapon. The lead agency, under the direction of a visible political
leader (e.g. the central city Mayor), can commit itself to the preparation
and implementation of a transit stoppage response plan and, in doing so,
can establish a firm stand with respect to the dispute over wages or
funding. In such a situation, the resources put into a response effort
and the hardships endured during a transit stoppage could be viewed as
an investment in a particular position or principle. In most situations,
however, the "political weapon" aspects of contingency planning will not
be this extreme, Still, artful manipulation of the plan development and
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implementation process, and of the information related to the planning
effort, can enable political leaders to subtly influence the resolution
of the conflict at hand.
The implications of political considerations for the task of
contingency planners are thus twofold. On one hand, it is possible that
contingency planners can sidestep some of the uncertainty associated with
transit disruption politics by consciously assessing the positions and
likely reactions of the many actors even remotely involved in the planning
or response process. On the other hand, it is almost inevitable that
contingency planners will see some aspect of their efforts or the plan
they produce affected by political gamesmanship.
2. Developing a Structured Approach to Contingency Planning and
Response Implementation
The conclusions included in, or implied by, the above summary
of the major issues which confront contingency planners all involve some
general suggestions as to how planners can deal with specific problems
encountered in developing a government response to an urban transit
stoppage. Apart from dealing with these specific problems, however,
those given the task of contingency planning will have to structure the
planning and response process in a manner that will increase the likeli-
hood of ultimately implementing an effective response. The three
disruptions studied in this research demonstrated three very different
approaches to structuring the response process. Based on these experiences
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and on the past research on disaster planning reviewed at the start of
this thesis, this concluding section proposes a generalized framework for
urban transit disruption contingency planning and response implementation.
The characteristics of urban transportation contingency
planning identified above indicate that there are likely to be elements
of a response process which are common to the implementation of an effec-
tive response to any urban transit system disruption, as well as elements
which depend specifically on the nature of the disruption immediately at
hand. The need to include both types of element in a contingency
planning effort suggests a model for contingency planning that consists
of two distinct steps: (1) Establish a "crisis management" structure that
can be used during any urban transit or other disruption by developing a
response strategy which outlines agency responsibilities and specifies a
communications network; and (2) Develop a specific implementation plan
for the anticipated disruption, one which can be updated and modified in
case of future transit stoppages of any kind.
A. Establishing a Crisis Management Structure and Response Strategy
A major factor contributing to the success of the New York
City transit strike response effort in 1980 was the existence of an
established Emergency Management Plan and the presence of the Emergency
Control Board. The fact that a basic structure for making a response to
an urban disruption -- in this case, a transit strike -- had already been
established made the development of a specific contingency plan much
easier. The Emergency Control Board, throughout the response planning
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and implementation process, was able to coordinate the use of City
resources and to maintain a centralized communications center.
The establishment of a crisis management structure in a metro-
politan area should therefore focus on the process to be followed in
making a response when a disruption becomes imminent. That is, an
organizational framework that designates a lead agency, specifies a cen-
tralized communications center, and outlines the role of each actor in
preparing and implementing a response to any transportation disruption
can be the basis of an effective crisis management structure. The desig-
nation of a lead agency could prove to be a stumbling block in some
situations. The New York approach of establishing an entirely new
organizational structure, the Emergency Control Board, to lead a response
is perhaps the best way to overcome initial conflicts over jurisdictions
or authority.
The second step in establishing a generalized crisis manage-
ment structure should address the issue of communications. A centralized
communications center is essential in contingency response situations, in
order to: (1) assure that disruption-related developments can be relayed
to the implementing agencies; (2) act as a conduit of information from the
implementing agencies to the lead agency; and (3) provide a contact point
for the news media and for public information. 11]
Finally, attention must be given to outlining the responsi-
bilities that each participant or outside actor will have in the event of
a transit service disruption. Because there will not be, hopefully, a
disruption imminent when this crisis management structure is first
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established, it may be difficult to specify the responsibilities of some
of the involved agencies in great detail. It is important simply to
ensure that the many agencies and groups to be involved understand what
will be expected of them. Some agencies will be responsible for imple-
menting actions developed by the lead agency, while others will enforce
them. Still other agencies will act as information brokers or as a
liaison with the news media. An important step in indentifying these
agency responsibilities is to assess the anticipated characteristics of a
disruption and to relate these characteristics to the type of involvement
required of the different government and private agencies.
If a metropolitan area is able to establish such a crisis
management structure, it will be well on the way to developing an effec-
tive response plan once a specific disruption becomes a distinct possi-
bility. Although it may not be reasonable to expect much more effort than
the above three steps to be put into developing a crisis management
structure when a disruption is not threatening, it is, of course, possible
to make more detailed preparations, even at the general level. Certain
activities can be anticipated to occur as part of any government-led
response to a transportation disruption, and they can be prepared long
before a disruption occurs.
For example, providing information on the disruption to the
public is among the most important responsibilities of government agencies.
Arrangements for disseminating such information can be made at any time
with the news media. Some of the information can be prepared in a
packaged form for release, particularly the arrangements to be made for
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public information in general, which are not likely to be determined by
the politics of a specific disruption. Another activity which will
occur in almost any transportation disruption is extensive police
enforcement of contingency measures. Because enforcement duties will
have an impact on the normal operations of police agencies, arrangements
can be made well in advance of a disruption with respect to how each
police agency will have to adapt.
In general, then, a crisis management structure can include
several activity-specific plans that can be prepared even before the possi-
bility of a particular transportation disruption arises. The greater the
effort put into establishing a generalized crisis management structure,
the smaller the effort that will be required to develop a specific response
implementation strategy. The complexity of the institutional relation-
ships which exist in most metropolitan areas, however, suggests that the
three steps of designating a lead agency, specifying a communications
system, and outlining the roles of different agencies in the event of a
disruption will be difficult enough tasks in themselves in the establish-
ment of a crisis management structure.
B. Developing a Specific Implementation Plan for a Disruption
The nature and context of a specific disruption will often
dictate the types of measure to be included in a response plan. An effort
to assess the range of measures available and the implementation problems
of each therefore provides a starting point for the development of a
detailed implementation plan when a transit stoppage seems imminent.
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The development of an implementation plan for a government response to
a specific transit disruption, although it is likely to differ from city
to city and from one situation to the next, should ideally include the
following steps [2]:
1. Assessment of previous experiences with the type of disruption
under consideration.
2. Identification of the likely characteristics of the impending
disruption and indentification of potential transportation
measures to match the anticipated needs.
3. Selection of transportation measures that can be quickly and
effectively implemented in the given situation.
4. Identification of the implementation requirements of the
measures selected.
5. Coordination of the implementation plan with the established
crisis management structure and any activity-specific plans
already in existence.
6. Modification of the plan as the disruption nears to account for
changing environmental conditions or unexpected actions by
participating or other agencies.
The three cases ctudied would suggest that, in developing such
an implementation plan, contingency planners must consider several subtle
aspects of the disruption and the ability of government agencies to respond.
For example, the dynamics of the crisis situation and the types of problem
that may arise, the response of individual travelers to the disruption
and to any contingency measures, along with the relationship of the
implementation plan to the resolution of such problems should all be of
concern in the development of an implementation plan.
The response implementation plan prepared specifically for a
given disruption and the crisis management structure that provides the
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foundation for response implementation are thus the core components of a
two-stage urban transportation contingency planning framework. Once
established, the crisis management structure need only be modified for
application to any urban transportation disruption, and in fact, is very
likely to be useful in dealing with other types of urban disruption or
even natural disasters. Similarly, the transit stoppage response
implementation plan, once it is developed and implemented, should only
have to be modified for use in similar disruptions in the future.
The extent to which large metropolitan areas are dependent on
mass transit was aptly demonstrated by the transit stoppages examined in
this thesis. Yet, while substantial attention has been given to planning
for government response to natural disasters, the preparation and imple-
mentation of a similar response to man-made urban disruptions such as
transit stoppages has gone virtually untouched by researchers and, more
importantly, planners and civic officials.
The observations made in this thesis suggest that the establish-
ment of metropolitan crisis management structures and the initial prepar-
ation of a response plan for a transit stoppage are at the same time both
simple and tremendously complicated. The benefits to an urban area of
having such a contingency response framework are substantial enough that
it would seem surprising to the casual observer that a metropolitan area
does not already possess one, The same institutional fragmentation,
jurisdictional conflicts, and political disagreements that serve as
obstacles to coordinated metropolitan transportation planning under
routine circumstances, however, are likely to impede the establishment of
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a crisis management structure as well. Decision-makers will not be
willing to commit themselves to such an effort when a disruption is not
threatening, and are unlikely to be receptive when a volatile political
dispute creates a transit stoppage threat. It is unfortunate, but very
likely, that most planners and decision-makers in metropolitan areas will
have to first experience the trauma of responding to a transit stoppage
on an ad-hoc basis before the possibility of developing a crisis manage-
ment structure is even recognized.
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